The Linguistic Turn and Castoriadis’ Thought: Language as Prattne and Imagination
The linguistic turn is a major turning point in 20th-century philosophy, as it brought the concept of language to the forefront as a fundamental dimension of human knowledge and social practice. It refers to a significant shift in philosophical understanding, arguing that philosophy is neither an empirical science nor a supra-empirical study of reality. Instead, it is a conceptual approach based on logic, aiming to analyze the complex relationships between philosophically significant concepts, as they arise from linguistic use.
Although the concept began with the publication of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus in 1921, the term was introduced by Richard Rorty in 1967. The linguistic turn describes the move away from traditional philosophical views that viewed language as a simple tool for describing reality and the promotion of the notion that language constructs our own experience of the world. Thinkers such as Ludwig Wittgenstein and the structuralists and post-structuralists, especially Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida, shaped this problematic, redefining the role of language in the construction of social practices, institutions and meaning.
Within this context, the thought of Cornelius Castoriadis, although not directly aligned with this direction, presents important commonalities but also notable differences. Castoriadis approached social and political becoming through the concept of “imaginary institutionalization” and autonomy, emphasizing the creative dimension of the radical imaginary and the ability of people to self-institutionalize. For this reason, it is crucial to investigate whether and how the linguistic turn is found in his work, focusing on the analogies and divergences with the central concepts of the philosophy of language.
The linguistic turn in philosophy: From Saussure to Wittgenstein and Foucault
The linguistic turn, founded on the thought of Ferdinand de Saussure, defines language as a system of signs consisting of the signifier and the signified. Saussure (1979) argued that the relationship between signifier and signified is arbitrary, while language functions as a closed system of symbols, which is developed through collective conventions. This approach formed the basis of structuralism, crucially influencing the subsequent development of linguistics and the social sciences.
At the same time, Wittgenstein (1977), with the concept of “language games”, emphasized that the meaning of words is determined by their use in specific social contexts, underlining the function of language and social practice. Such language games are, for example, the language of Christians, or of scientists, the everyday language we use in our communication, the philosophical language, etc.
To make these more understandable, let us contrast the term “faith” between Christian language and everyday language.
In the Christian context, “faith” refers to a deep and unwavering trust in God and the teachings of Jesus Christ. It is not just a belief, but an inner certainty based on spiritual experience and acceptance of the divine plan. Example: “Faith in Christ leads us to salvation.” The word “faith” here has a theological meaning, referring to an existential relationship with God.
On the contrary, in its everyday use, the word “faith” can simply mean trust in someone or something, without necessarily involving a theological or spiritual dimension. Example: “I have faith in my companions that they will help me.” Here, the word “faith” refers to a simple human trust and does not have the weight of religious faith.
With this example, one understands that the same word can carry very different meanings depending on the context of its use, depending on whether this is religious or everyday.
While Wittgenstein focused on linguistic conventions and language games, Foucault (2017) went deeper and developed a more dynamic approach to language as a means of controlling and shaping reality. In his work “The Archaeology of Knowledge”, he argues that knowledge is not something neutral or objective, but is shaped and controlled through “discourses”, which are sets of statements related to power. Discourses constitute the framework within which objects of knowledge are created and given meaning, such as mental health, crime, gender and sexuality.
This means that language is not simply a means that people use to communicate and describe the world, but an active tool that contributes to the formation of knowledge and the embodiment of specific forms of power. Every discourse includes rules and procedures that determine what can be said, who can say it, and under what conditions it is accepted as true or valid. Thus, linguistic conventions are embedded in a network of power, as certain topics become objects of public discussion or research, while others are excluded or silenced. Foucault shows how institutions (e.g., the school, the judicial system, the hospital) and the discourses that surround them regulate who has the power to produce knowledge and control it (Foucault, 2017).
Language and the Imaginary in the Work of Cornelius Castoriadis
Castoriadis is one of the most important thinkers of the 20th century, with his theory of the imaginary institutionalization of society being a fundamental axis of his thought. Within the framework of this theory, he examines the relationship between society, institutions, meanings, and language. The concept of “imaginary institutionalization” refers to the way in which societies create their own system of values, rules, and symbolic forms, which guides the lives of their members. This system is not simply the result of logical organization or objective conditions, but a product of human imagination (Castoriadis, 1978).
According to Castoriadis, every society forms an “imaginary universe” or a set of imaginary forms and meanings that determine the way in which people perceive and organize their world. These imaginary forms, or “social imaginary meanings”, have no reference to “objective” reality, but function as frames of meaning that guide human activities, moral values and social structures. Institutions, norms and values, therefore, do not arise automatically from the nature of people or some historical necessity, but are produced by this imaginary institutionalization (Castoriadis, 1978). For example, concepts such as the state, law, justice, or religion are not something “natural” or universal. Each society produces its own particular meanings, which are differentiated from the corresponding meanings of other societies.
Castoriadis here radically differs from the perception of the linguistic turn, as he does not consider language as a primary and determining element of social and political creation. His criticism focuses on the fact that linguistic analysis, although important, is limited to the sphere of expression and cannot explain the source of human creativity, which is located in the imaginary dimension. According to Castoriadis (1999), the emphasis on language by thinkers of the linguistic turn, such as Wittgenstein and Derrida, distances them from the question of creation and autonomy. Language, although necessary for the constitution of social forms, is not the source of creativity. Society is not constituted simply through linguistic systems, but through an ever-evolving process of imaginative institutionalization, in which people create new social forms and meanings beyond linguistic conventions.
This dimension of human creativity, which transcends language, is central to Castoriadis’s theory of autonomy. Autonomy, for the thinker, is not only the capacity to formulate new linguistic meanings or reinterpret existing ones, but the capacity to recreate the very institutions and systems that define our lives. Instead of language, the primary force for the creation of social forms and institutions is what Castoriadis calls the “radical imaginary.” This concept suggests a creative force that operates beyond logic or language. The radical imaginary is the source of new forms and structures that did not exist before and that cannot be fully explained in terms of existing logical or linguistic structures. It is the creative capacity of people to form new ideas, institutions, and social structures that redefine the context in which they live (Castoriadis, 1978).
Here, Castoriadis’s difference with the linguistic turn also becomes particularly clear. While philosophers of the linguistic turn see language as the basic tool for constructing meaning, Castoriadis considers that the creation of meaning pre-exists language. Language is the medium through which imaginary meanings are expressed, but it is not their source. According to Castoriadis, the radical imaginary is what is responsible for the creation of all social forms, from the simplest to the most complex. It is what leads to the production of new forms of social organization, such as democracy or religion, and of institutions, such as laws, courts, or political ideologies. These forms and institutions acquire meaning through the imagination and are then expressed and reinforced through the language and symbolic forms used by each society (Castoriadis, 1978).
Furthermore, another important element is the timelessness of imaginary institutionalization. Every society, although it creates new forms and institutions, does not start from scratch. The imaginary institutionalization of each society involves the elaboration of previous social forms and institutions, which have been created in the past, and the formation of new forms based on them. This process of constant re-creation and revision is central to social change. In this context, the radical imaginary is not only a force of innovation, but also a force of feedback and reinterpretation of existing institutions. Societies are not static, but continually redefine the meaning of their institutions and forms of social organization through this process. Imaginary institutionalization constantly creates new meanings, thus allowing for social evolution and transformation (Castoriadis, 1978). This approach highlights the need to examine social structures through the prism of historical development and cultural heritage, something that can be ignored in the theory of the linguistic turn, which focuses mainly on linguistic representation and the importance of language in the creation of social reality.
Conclusion
The thought of Cornelius Castoriadis constitutes a crucial contribution to philosophy and social theory, especially in the sense of the “imaginary institutionalization of society”. In contrast to the linguistic turn, which clearly places language at the center of human knowledge and social formation, Castoriadis prioritizes the imaginary dimension as a fundamental force of social creation. For Castoriadis, language is not the primary creative force, but simply a channel through which the imaginary creations of society are expressed and reinforced. The radical imaginary, as the thinker defines it, is the driving force behind the production of new forms of social organization and institutions, going beyond linguistic analysis and offering a more dynamic perception of autonomy at both the individual and collective levels.
The theory of imaginary institutionalization highlights the power of human creativity, which not only redefines social reality, but also restructures it through continuous processes of feedback and reinterpretation of institutions and values. This approach, which places imagination at the core of social creation, offers a substantive critique of the linguistic turn and leads us to a deeper understanding of human creativity and the autonomy of societies and individuals.
Bibliography
Kastoriadis, K. (1978). The Imaginary Institution of Society. Athens: Kedros.
Castoriadis, K. (1999). The Shattered World. Athens: Ypsilon.
Foucault, M. (2017). The Archaeology of Knowledge. Athens: PLETHRON
Saussure, F. de. (1979). Courses in General Linguistics. Athens: Papazisis.
Wittgenstein, L. (1977). Philosophical Investigations. Athens: Papazisis.