The Postmodern Crisis of Subjectivity

In traditional philosophical thought, the subject occupied a stable position, linking autonomy, rationality and moral action. The “ego” perceived itself as a central entity that remained constant in time and space, while the world around it, nature, society, could change. This stability was fundamental for the constitution of identity and subjectivity. For example, Descartes, with the famous “cogito ergo sum” (I think, therefore I am), defines the subject as an autonomous, enduring and self-existent substance (res cogitans). Descartes’ “ego” is the core of the subject, which, through thought, remains stable and unchanging. Later, Kant believed that the subject can transcend external conditions through “pure reason,” which allows him to determine his moral actions based on the categorical imperative, regardless of empirical or material influences.

However, with the advent of modernity and the subsequent deconstruction of “grand narratives” (Lyotard, 1994), the subject found itself radically challenged. This crisis of subjectivity is not limited to the existential crisis of the subject; on the contrary, it goes deeper and constitutes a crisis with a political dimension, since it affects the ability of individuals to act as autonomous beings in the collective institution of society (Castoriadis, 1978). Modern man does not only experience alienation from himself, but also alienation from the social and political processes that determine his life. The “Ego” is lost in the labyrinth.

The heteronomy of the market and the role of technology in shaping subjectivity

The market is one of the main institutions that lead the modern subject to a state of heteronomy. According to Castoriadis (1978), the capitalist imaginary meaning of “endless growth” shapes the value system of modern society, defining human existence through consumption. The individual is no longer autonomous, but a hetero-determined subject who depends on the laws of the market.

However, sterile consumption is not limited to material goods, but extends to experiences, relationships and the very way of life. Guy Debord (1994) describes this situation as a “society of the spectacle”, where people live through images and symbolic representations, distant from real life. The subject becomes a spectator in the theater of his life, while his desires and values ​​are shaped by the buzzwords of advertising and the entertainment industry. This in turn leads to a kind of consumer alienation, where the desires and needs of the individual are not his own, but products of external imposition. The subject does not recognize his own alienation and lives in a vicious circle of unfulfilled desires.

At the same time, the role of technology is also central to understanding the crisis of subjectivity. Castoriadis (1978) refers to the dominance of “technocratic logic”, which reduces all problems of society to technical issues, thus removing the political dimension of decisions. The citizen ceases to actively participate in the institution of society and is replaced by so-called “experts”.

New information technologies (such as algorithmic platforms, artificial intelligence, etc.) have the potential to influence subjectivity in subtle ways. As Shoshanna Zuboff (2023) aptly writes, the “capitalist surveillance system” constantly records and controls users’ preferences through data. Then, specialized algorithms, based on this data, shape the subject’s choices and direct them along predetermined paths. This “algorithmic control” is linked to the alienation of the subject, since it limits their ability to self-determine and self-reflect.

The Existential Void as the Collapse of Grand Narratives

The collapse of “grand narratives” in postmodernity, as Lyotard (1994) argued, led to the inability of the subject to find meaning in his life. The term “grand narratives” refers to the loss of trust in the systems of meaning that offered guidelines for society and the individual. Examples of such narratives are the ideologies of the Enlightenment, Marxism, but also traditional religious worldviews, which presented comprehensive explanations for the life, history and future of humanity.

These grand narratives were for centuries the foundation of subjective stability. Through them, the individual could find a purpose in his life, define his identity and understand his place in the world. For example, the Enlightenment introduced a belief in progress, rational thought, and the autonomy of the individual. Marxism, on the other hand, promised the liberation of man from exploitation and the construction of a just classless society. Finally, religions have historically provided metaphysical explanations for existence, offering solace through belief in a higher power and the promise of an afterlife and bliss.

However, Lyotard (1994) argues that in postmodernity, these narratives have lost their credibility. Scientific challenge, philosophical deconstruction (such as that of Derrida), and the realization of practical failure (such as communist or neoliberal regimes) have shown that these narratives were not as neutral and true as they were presented. The supposed “neutrality” of science has been revealed as a tool of power, as seen in colonialism, technocracy and the environmental destruction caused by the logic of development.

However, if the collective stories that once gave meaning to human life have been dissolved, then the individual is called upon to create his own meaning on his own. In postmodernity, the individual assumes the role of the autonomous constructor of his identity, but without having any stable foundation. In this context, the subject is confronted with uncertainty, gets lost in the inflation of information and finally, as Zygmunt Bauman (2013) says, turns into a “fluid subject” demonstrating that his identity is constantly changing depending on the conditions of each era. The individual now understands that he must seek an internal center of gravity, an “inner guide”, in order to define himself. However, this is not an easy task. The autonomy of the modern individual is both a burden and a challenge, as the subject must constantly choose the meaning of his existence. Where in the past, his identity was associated with clear roles such as “worker”, “Christian”, “citizen” etc., in postmodernity, the subject is called to constantly create himself.

Castoriadis offers an alternative, optimistic perspective on the crisis of subjectivity. While he clearly recognizes the deconstruction of grand narratives, he does not end up with Lyotard’s nihilism. On the contrary, he argues that the subject can achieve a radical autonomy, creating his own values ​​through collective self-institution (Castoriadis, 1978). The thinker argues that the subject must cease to rely on prefabricated narratives and become a co-creator of society and his own identity. This possibility, however, requires a radical change in the anthropological type, namely the emergence of an autonomous human being; not as an ideal or abstract subject, but as an existing and historically contingent project, which stems from the very possibility of social self-institution.

The Collective Overman?

Castoriadis’s concept of the “autonomous man” can be seen as a collective reinterpretation of Friedrich Nietzsche’s Overman. A philosophical shift that highlights the role of collective creation in the constitution of the autonomy of the subject. The Overman, as introduced by Nietzsche, is the personification of the creative power that emerges through the collapse of the metaphysical order and the recognition of the “death of God” (Nietzsche, 1883/1995). Rejecting the resentment and servile morality of the Christian tradition, Nietzsche proposes a type of man who creates new values ​​and embodies the will to power, living beyond the opposition of good and evil (Reginster, 2006). In the concept of the Overman, however, autonomy is completely individual, drawing its power from individual will and the overcoming of nihilism, without requiring collective recognition or participation.

In contrast, Castoriadis, through his work, proposes a radically different project for autonomy. For him, autonomy is not an individual state but a collective process. The autonomous person is given meaning and exists within the framework of a society that recognizes its ability to create and transform its institutions and meanings, through the social imaginary (Castoriadis, 1978). Autonomy, here, is not an individual overcoming of social boundaries, but a collective capacity to recognize institutions as human creations and to subject them to reflective criticism.

What makes the autonomous subject a collective reinterpretation of the Overman is the rejection of loneliness and distancing from society, characteristics that clearly permeate the Nietzschean vision. The Overman embodies an absolute autonomy that does not need collectivity to create new values. In contrast, Castoriadis places autonomy in the realm of the social imagination, a process where meaning and values ​​are produced through collective dialogue and participatory action (Arnason, 2001).

At the same time, the philosophical dimension of transcendence differentiates the two approaches. In Nietzsche, the transcendence of traditional values ​​and institutions is the result of the individual will to power, which is driven by the personal need to create meaning. In Castoriadis, transcendence emerges through reflective critique and collective action, making autonomy a continuous process of questioning and re-creating social institutions. Here, democracy becomes the space within which autonomy can be realized, something that is absent from Nietzschean thought.

This opposition, ultimately, reflects the difference between the individual and collective dimensions of autonomy. While the Overman proposes the solitary transcendence of man who lives beyond social conventions, the autonomous man is based on the recognition of society as a field of creation and questioning. Nietzsche rejects collective action as limiting for individual creativity, while Castoriadis includes it as a condition for the very existence of autonomy. Castoriadis’s thought highlights the importance of democratic process, dialogue, and social imagination in the construction of human freedom, proposing a way of understanding autonomy that recognizes the reflective capacity of society as fundamental to human creativity. Ultimately, Castoriadis’ ideas lend an optimistic perspective to an otherwise bleak landscape.

In conclusion

While the postmodern era highlights the deconstruction of fixed identities and narratives, this fluidity can be an opportunity for the creation of a new anthropological type. The transition from heteronomy to autonomy, both at the individual and collective levels, requires a paradigm shift in the perception of the self and society. The possibility for radical autonomy and self-establishment is real, but it requires a profound transformation of human consciousness and practice. The new anthropological type that must emerge, the autonomous human, embodies this challenge, linking individual self-knowledge with collective action.

Overcoming the crisis of subjectivity, therefore, does not lie in returning to traditional narratives or in absolute Nietzschean individuality, but in developing a new quality that combines critical thinking, collectivity, and creativity. The contemporary crisis of meaning, although painful, can play a catalytic role for a more meaningful and authentic existence on both a personal and a social level.

Bibliography

Arnason, J. P. (2001). The Imaginary Constitution of Modernity: Cornelius Castoriadis. European Journal of Social Theory, 4(4), 351–364.

Bauman, Z. (2013). Liquid modernity.

Castoriadis, C. (1978). The Imaginary Institution of Society.

Debord, G. (2016). Η Κοινωνία του Θεάματος.

Lyotard, J. F. (1994). The postmodern condition. The postmodern turn: new perspectives on modern theory, 27-38.

Nietzsche, F. (1883/2008). Τάδε έφη Ζαρατούστρα.

Reginster, B. (2006). The Affirmation of Life: Nietzsche on Overcoming Nihilism.

Zuboff, S. (2023). The age of surveillance capitalism. In Social theory re-wired (pp. 203-213).

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