The imaginary institution of nature and the ecological dimension of autonomy

The imaginary institution of nature • Elias Sekeris

The imaginary institution of nature and the ecological dimension of autonomy

The ecological crisis and the need for a new way of viewing the relationship between humans and the natural world are issues that preoccupied both Cornelius Castoriadis and Murray Bookchin, two of the most important thinkers of the 20th century. Despite the differences in their approach, both thinkers focus on the necessity of a radical reorganization of the way in which societies perceive nature. Bookchin, with his theory of social ecology, argues that the ecological crisis is a product of the hierarchical and oppressive social structures that characterize the modern world. Castoriadis, on the other hand, through his theory of autonomy and imaginary institution, proposes a more profound change in the fundamental values ​​and meanings that compose social life, emphasizing that the ecological crisis is a symptom of the broader cultural crisis that permeates the modern world. The combined analysis of the two theories can offer a comprehensive approach to nature and ecology, laying the foundation for the creation of a sustainable and autonomous society.

The imaginary institution of nature

The imaginary institution of nature is a crucial point for understanding not only the ecological crisis but also the very social and political organization of contemporary Western societies.

But what do we mean by the term “imaginary institution of nature”?

Cornelius Castoriadis, the proponent of the concept of the imaginary, through his critique of the Western metaphysical tradition, brings to the fore the historicity and social construction of nature as an object, institutionalized through the imaginary of societies. In modernity, nature ceases to be a living organism – as, for example, the ancient Greeks understood it through the term “cosmos” or the Eastern philosophies as a whole – and is transformed into a mechanistic space, a stripped “resource” for exploitation. Man, motivated by the Cartesian imaginary of the subject-object distinction, becomes “master and possessor” of nature (Descartes, 1637/2005), alienating himself from it and from his vital connection with it.

This alienation is not a natural evolution of human thought, but is the result of specific historical and cultural processes. The imaginary institutionalization of nature in the Western world is linked to the rise of the capitalist economy and the instrumentalization of human action through technology. This institutionalization is based on the “unlimited expansion of rationality”, where everything natural or human becomes an object of rationalization and domination (Castoriadis, 1999 a).

The recognition of nature as an institutionalized category deconstructs the essentialist approach that treats it as an external reality. In this context, Castoriadis proposes an alternative imaginary institution, where nature is reintegrated into the collective and individual imaginary, as a space of coexistence and creativity and not as an object of exploitation. Here, autonomy comes to the fore: society is called upon to reflect on and recreate its relationship with nature, founding new institutions based on respect and reciprocity.

Ecological Crisis and Technocracy: Castoriadis’ Critique

The ecological crisis, then, is not a simple set of environmental problems, as many ecological movements and activists perceive it. It is a symptom of a profound deregulation of the imaginary and the institutionalized logic of Western society. The core of the crisis lies in the dynamics of technocracy, whose logic is inherently alienating.

Technocratic thought sees nature as nothing more than a problem to be solved through technical means. Furthermore, the philosophy of sovereignty that permeates modern society leads to the annihilation of the natural world in the name of “progress.” This logic emerges through the combination of scientific thought and the capitalist pursuit of profit, producing a double alienation: both of man from nature and from human subjectivity itself (Castoriadis, 1999 b).

At the same time, technocracy cannot respond to ecological challenges because, of course, it remains trapped in precisely this logic that gave rise to the crisis. The ecological crisis requires a radical questioning of the imaginary of sovereignty and uncontrolled development. In this light, Castoriadis (1978) emphasizes the need for a different way of thinking, where political action and collective reflection will pave the way for a substantial direct democratic reorganization of social life.

Castoriadis and Bookchin Discussion: Ecology and Democracy

The connection of ecology with democracy is a crucial point, both in the thought of Castoriadis and in that of Murray Bookchin. Although the two thinkers start from different philosophical traditions, they converge on the need for a radical revision of the way in which societies are organized and perceive their relationship with nature. However, their differences in the way they approach the concept of autonomy and the position of the ecological issue highlight interesting philosophical contrasts.

Bookchin, through his work and especially in social ecology, argues that the ecological crisis is inextricably linked to hierarchical structures and political inequality. He sees the domination of man over nature as an extension of the domination of man over man (Bookchin, 1982). For the American thinker, the solution lies not only in protecting the environment through technocratic measures, but in the radically transformative power of direct democracy. His social ecology rejects both the one-dimensional development of technology and the idea of ​​nature as independent of society.

Castoriadis, for his part, emphasizes the imaginary dimension of the human relationship with nature and the centrality of autonomy as a prerequisite for any ecological solution. Democracy, for Castoriadis, is not simply a decision-making process, but a total reconstruction of the way in which people make sense of the world and their role in it. The ecological crisis, therefore, is not only a question of social hierarchies, as Bookchin argues, but also the result of a fundamental alienation of man from nature, but also from himself.

Where Bookchin proposes institutional change through direct democracy, Castoriadis introduces the deeper need to subvert the imaginary that legitimizes the logic of sovereignty. For Bookchin, nature and society are dialectically connected, but for Castoriadis, this connection remains unattainable without the human capacity to reflect on its institutions and values. Collective reflection and critical autonomy are the key to challenging the instrumental and technocratic view of nature.

Democracy, according to Castoriadis, acquires an ecological dimension when the citizen becomes a co-creator of social and environmental contexts, rather than treating nature as an external category. This approach goes beyond Bookchin, as it emphasizes that no institutional change can be sustainable without the renewal of the human imaginary. The human-nature relationship, therefore, is both a political and an ontological challenge, requiring a new way of being and acting.

Revisiting Bookchin: Critique and Extension through Castoriadis’ Thought

Bookchin proposes the creation of an eco-communitarian society based on the principle of rational interdependence of humans and nature (Bookchin, 2023). While this view is particularly important for connecting the ecological issue to democracy, it limits the possibility of transformation to the level of institutional change. According to Castoriadis, institutions are products of imaginary institutionalization, and therefore any change at the level of institutions requires a radical revision of the way in which we make sense of our social and physical existence.

Bookchin treats nature as a system with inherent “ecological principles” that can guide social transformation. In contrast, Castoriadis sees nature as open and indeterminate, an abyss of meaning that does not impose any specific social structure. This means that values ​​and practices related to nature cannot depend solely on “natural laws” but require a continuous critical and creative process (Castoriadis, 1978).

Thus, where Bookchin proposes a new social organization, Castoriadis argues that the very imaginary institution of nature as a tool or object to be exploited must be deconstructed. According to Castoriadis, modernity is characterized by an instrumental conception of nature, which is the product of the imaginary domination of economic and technological rationality. Bookchin does not give sufficient emphasis to this fundamental dimension of the imaginary, which limits his theory to the level of practical rather than ontological changes.

The Castoriadian approach can extend Bookchin’s theory by incorporating the dimension of autonomy as a prerequisite for any substantial ecological change. Reflection on the very institutions and values ​​of society is the only path to liberation from the imaginary constructions that legitimize the destruction of nature. Thus, while Bookchin proposes an institutional return to the harmony of nature and society, Castoriadis goes deeper, proposing a total reconstruction of the imaginary that gives meaning to this relationship.

Towards an Alternative Imaginary Institution: Autonomy and the Human-Nature Relationship

We have seen that the contemporary imaginary institutionalization of capitalism (but also of Marxism) perceives nature as an unlimited resource that can be consumed in the context of perpetual development. This perception is not simply economic, but deeply ontological, as it reproduces a type of human who sees the world instrumentally, cut off from its natural basis (Latouche, 2009). Castoriadis argues that transcending this logic requires the creation of a new anthropological type, a subject who recognizes himself as part of a larger ecological and social whole.

In this context, autonomy includes the recognition of nature as a value in itself, independent of human needs. In an autonomous society, the human-nature relationship is not one of domination but of symbiosis and respect. Such a relationship, however, is only possible when societies abandon the logics of instrumental domination and turn towards a more substantial and meaningful understanding of the world.

In conclusion, the refoundation of the imaginary concerns not only nature but also man himself. Change cannot be limited to external reforms but must include a profound transformation of the anthropological type that has developed in modernity. This new type of human being must combine the capacity for autonomy with a sense of collective responsibility towards the world. A new alternative imaginary institution involves the cultivation of a new way of being, where autonomy and ecology are not treated as separate spheres but as deeply intertwined. In this context, man is not a conqueror of nature but a part of it, acting as a co-creator of a sustainable world. The crisis, therefore, is not simply a catastrophe but also an opportunity for the foundation of a new social and ontological order.

Bibliography

Castoriadis, C. (1978). The Imaginary Institution of Society. Athens: Kedros.

Castoriadis, C. (1999 a). The Crossroads of the Labyrinth. Athens: Ypsilon.

Castoriadis, C. (1999 b). A world in fragments. Athens: Ypsilon.

Descartes, R. (2005). Discourse on Method and the Meditations. Penguin UK.

Bookchin, M. (1982). The ecology of freedom.

Bookchin, M. (2023). Remaking Society: A New Ecological Politics. AK Press.

Latouche, S. (2009). Farewell to growth. Polity.

 

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The imaginary institution of nature and the ecological dimension of autonomy

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