Creation, Imaginary, Autonomy

Introduction

The philosophical tradition of the West has, to a large extent, been shaped under the weight of a fundamental ontological constant: that Being is identified with what is logically determinable, with that which can be fully grasped, represented, and explained through concepts, categories, and identities (Taylor, 2004). From Parmenides to Aristotle, and from Descartes to Hegel and Marx, Western thought has returned obsessively to this axiom of the rationality of Being. Within this framework, philosophy functioned as a tool for organizing the world: a means through which indeterminacy is transformed into system, and multiplicity/otherness into unity. The very notion of truth presupposed that reality could be entirely revealed through a coherent web of linguistic and logical representation.

Cornelius Castoriadis formulates a radically subversive proposition against this fundamental assumption: he argues that Being is not a set, but a “magma”. Being cannot be exhausted in logical distinctions and categorizations; it is, above all, creation – emergent novelty, radically non-causally predictable, beyond any closed logic. His ontology of creation marks a rupture in the way we conceive of reality, history, praxis, and society.

Yet, the novelty of his thought does not lie only in the introduction of new concepts, but in the reconstruction of the very philosophical terms traditionally used to articulate the experience of the world: Being, causality, form, subjectivity, otherness, society. At the center of his proposition stand the notions of emergence and the social imaginary as the radical source of creativity.

The present study seeks to delve into Castoriadis’ systematic ontology of creation, as articulated in his work, and to highlight how it relates to the critique of the logic of identity, the introduction of the concept of magma, the foundation of the imaginary institution of society, and the problematic of autonomy as a philosophical and political possibility. It is an attempt to transform the very way we think about the possibility of the new – the non-derivative, the radically other, the creative.

The critique of ensemblistic – identitary logic

Castoriadis (1998, pp. 221-237) identifies at the heart of the Western philosophical tradition a logical structure that characterizes the relation of thought to Being: what he calls “ensemblistic–identitary logic”. This logic is based on the conviction that whatever exists can be fully understood, described, and determined as a member of a set, according to criteria of identity and conceptual categorization.

Examples abound: Plato’s ideal order of beings, Aristotelian essentialism, Hegelian dialectics, and so forth. Over the centuries, Western thought has sought to reduce the multiplicity of the real into a universally coherent logical system (Habermas, 1984, pp. 1-20). Castoriadis, however, insists that this ontological stance leads ultimately to a universally closed system in which there is no space for indeterminacy, novelty, or the radically new (Arnason, 1989; Castoriadis, 1991). Ensemblistic –identitary logic seeks to eliminate the internal tension of multiplicity and reconstruct reality as a series of clearly defined identities. Anything that cannot be incorporated into the existing web of meanings is regarded as either false or unintelligible.

The conception of Being as a completed set ignores, according to Castoriadis (1998, pp. 152; 370), the fundamental experience of becoming: the continuous emergence of new forms of life, institutions, meanings, and actions. History, politics, and art bear witness to the presence of creative indeterminacy. Social movements, revolutions, artistic ruptures cannot be explained as mere mechanical expressions of pre-existing structures. Rather, they are realizations of an element that escapes the logic of identity.

In The Imaginary Institution of Society, Castoriadis (1998) stresses that this logic constitutes a profound ontological illusion, since it transforms Being into something fully determined, thereby excluding emergence as a category. It amounts to a form of metaphysical coercion – where reality must obey logical terms, even when lived experience testifies to the opposite.

Ensemblistic – identitary logic is therefore not only inadequate, but also an obstacle to conceiving humanity as creative and society as potentially autonomous. A thought that reproduces only existing schemas cannot grasp the praxis that transcends them radically. As Castoriadis underlines in Passion et connaissance, knowledge is never severed from passion, and imagination is not the enemy of truth but its very condition (Castoriadis, 2007, pp. 145-147). Logic alone cannot explain the constitution of the world.

Magma as a meta – ontological category

The concept of magma forms the cornerstone of Castoriadis’ alternative ontology. It is an ontological conception that questions the very logical constitution of Being. The magma is the fundamentally non-(fully) reducible, non-completable, and non-representable element of reality (Castoriadis, 1998, pp. 340-344; 370-371). In contrast to the set, which is fully defined by its members and can be exhaustively analyzed, the magma cannot be reduced to its formations. It produces forms – concepts, institutions, symbolisms – yet none of these can fully capture it, nor stabilize it. The magma is not form but the very precondition of the genesis of forms – the source of all structures.

Castoriadis borrows the term “magma” from geology but transforms it into a philosophical principle: Being is not “substance” but a dynamic field of form-giving, without definitive determination. Thus, magma functions as a meta-ontological category, for it does not belong to the traditional schemas of being/non-being, identity/difference (Arnason, 1989).

Through the notion of magma, Castoriadis seeks to shatter the dominance of the logic that has shaped the philosophical imaginary of the West: the demand that every existence must be fully sayable, imaginable, and identifiable. The magma is the substratum from which reality emerges without being exhausted in any of its forms. Any attempt to “determine” it logically results in paradox: the determinable cannot explain the creative (Castoriadis, 1991; 2007).

The significance of the magma is crucial at every level:

• Ontologically, it asserts that Being cannot be exhausted by logic.

• Epistemologically, it reveals the limits of representation and theoretical discourse.

• Politically and anthropologically, it underpins the idea that humanity, as a creative force, is not merely a product but a bearer of emergence.

Finally, the magma provides Castoriadis with an alternative basis for thinking the historicity of the world. There is no predetermined schema, no causal necessity. Being is in continuous genesis, just as society both institutes and reflects upon itself.

The rupture with necessity

Within this framework, one of Castoriadis’ deepest philosophical aims is the deconstruction of the notion of necessity, as established both in metaphysical tradition and in modern theories of history and science. As noted earlier, the dominant philosophical stance – from Aristotelian teleology to Hegelian historicism and Marxist dialectics -presupposes a causally structured world, where the new is never truly new but a necessary outcome of pre-existing conditions (Lefort, 1986, pp. 250-255).

Castoriadis articulates the notion of emergence precisely to oppose such reductionist logic. Emergence signals the possibility of the radically new, which cannot be deduced or causally/ logically derived from prior structures or states (Castoriadis, 1998, pp. 370-373). We do not have transformations within a closed system, but ruptures, breaks, realizations of the unpredictable. This has profound ontological implications. Creation is not the result of some internal necessity or external cause; rather, it is a mode of existence – the emergence of meanings, forms, and institutions without pre-existing determining patterns. In this view, history is neither “natural process” nor “science,” but an open trajectory constituted by praxis and by imaginary ruptures with what already exists.

The rupture with necessity also entails rejecting any deterministic or teleological interpretation of the social. Castoriadis is especially critical of theories such as Marxist historical materialism, which assume a necessary logic of development of social forms. For him, such accounts subordinate human praxis to abstract laws and deny the very possibility of freedom (Castoriadis, 2003).

Emergence is also directly related to the concept of time. Contrary to philosophies that treat time as a linear span awaiting the realization of a pre-given potentiality, Castoriadis proposes a time of creation. Temporality is not a neutral dimension but the very field in which the impossible up to now becomes actual. Time is open – and so too is Being (Castoriadis, 1998).

Ultimately, Castoriadis’ thought collides with every form of metaphysical necessity. Being is neither completed nor interpretable by reduction. It is a field of possibility, which implies that history is not fate but instituted and instituting praxis.

Society as imaginary (self-)institution

From here we arrive at the core of Castoriadis’ contribution to contemporary philosophy: the conception of society not as a structure or functional mechanism, but as a system of imaginary institution. At the center of this claim lies the notion of the social imaginary, which is not a psychological or cultural superstructure upon an “objective” social substratum, but the very source of the creation of social forms of Being (Castoriadis, 1998).

Society, according to this view, institutes itself (Castoriadis, 1991; Castoriadis, 1998, pp. 359-364; Taylor, 2004). Its institutions – language, law, religion, politics, techniques of organization, and so on – are not products of natural necessity, biological evolution, or external causality, but formations of imaginary production. This does not mean they arise from “nothing” but that they do not follow a deterministic causal continuity.

Imaginary institution is radically autonomous and indeterminate. Each society creates its own network of meanings, which functions as the self-evident – namely, that system of meaning which is not questioned by its members. Castoriadis introduces here the crucial distinction between imaginary and imagination: the imaginary is not private projection or arbitrary invention, but a collective, historically active force of form-giving. Thus, social reality is constituted as a web of meanings generated from within, without external grounding. In this institution, the subject – object relation collapses. There is no pre-given “nature” of the world upon which meaning is overlaid; rather, the world is socio-ontologically constructed through the imaginary. This position rejects every realist or positivist conception of society and opens the field for recognizing praxis as a primordial constituent of existence.

This imaginary self-institution is directly linked to the central philosophical notion of creation. Every society creates its limits, its meanings, its institutions – and this creation cannot be sufficiently explained by biological or material factors. The social imaginary is the non-causal matrix of the social. Hence, every society embodies a different “truth” of the world – not as a relativistic variation, but as the incarnation of a different ontological regime (Castoriadis, 1998).

Understanding society as imaginary self-institution also has significant political consequences. If institutions are not necessary, then they can change. If the social is self-produced, then the possibility exists for reflection and radical transformation (Arnason, 1989; Castoriadis, 2003). This is the ground upon which the notion of autonomy rests, to which we now turn.

Autonomy as ontological consequence

The notion of autonomy in Castoriadis – unlike other approaches (e.g., the Italian autonomists) – is not presented as a moral ideal or demand, but as a profound ontological possibility that arises from the fundamental nature of human and social creativity. Autonomy is not simply a condition of freedom vis-à-vis external constraints, but the conscious assumption of the imaginary institution by the subject and by society (Castoriadis, 1998 pp. 101-107; Castoriadis, 1991, pp.143-145).

To understand autonomy as an ontological category, we must return to the notions of magma and emergence. Since Being is not a stable set but a dynamic multiplicity, and society is constituted through radical creative ruptures, it follows that this creation can itself become the object of conscious praxis. Autonomy, therefore, is not merely a demand of political organization but an ontological capacity of humanity to reflect upon its own Being.

Castoriadis views the ancient Greek polis as the first historical realization of autonomy – not because it established a perfect political system, but because it inaugurated the historical possibility of a self-instituting society: a society that recognizes its laws and institutions as its own, and thus as subject to change through collective action (Castoriadis, 2007).

Individual autonomy is inseparable from the social, not to be confused with individualism. The individual becomes autonomous when it recognizes the imaginary constitution of both itself and society, and is capable of reflecting upon and acting in relation to it. Unlike philosophies that ground freedom in the self-determination of will or the logic of universal law (e.g., Kant’s categorical imperative), Castoriadis grounds autonomy in the radical capacity for form-creation – and in humanity’s ability to assume responsibility for that creation.

Autonomy, therefore, is neither pre-given nor guaranteed. It is a continuous process, a struggle against heteronomy: the tendency of humans and societies to regard their institutions and values as external, necessary, transcendent (Castoriadis, 1998). Heteronomy, beyond oppression and coercion, is also the forgetting of the imaginary foundation of the social. In this sense, Castoriadis’ thought transcends liberal individualism by grounding a radical ontological project of freedom, where praxis, reflection, and creation are inseparably connected. Being, as creation, already contains the presupposition of autonomy; the question is whether subject and society will actualize it.

Conclusion

Castoriadis’ philosophical proposition constitutes a radical rupture in the history of ontological thought, for it breaks with the tradition that identifies Being with the logically determinable and causally explainable, and introduces a new category of Being as creative indeterminacy: as a magma of creative energy, a field of possibilities realized through emergence.

At the heart of this ontology lies the notion of creation as the act of emergence of the novel, without external causality or necessity. Reality, history, society – all emerge within a temporality that does not obey any teleology but opens itself to unpredictability and chaos (Arnason, 1989; Castoriadis, 1991).

Society, then, is neither mechanistic nor an object of scientific explanation, but a collective creator of forms through its social imaginary. Imaginary (self-)institution renders society open and creative. From here arises the possibility of autonomy: not as a choice between predetermined paths, but as the conscious assumption of institution, both individually and collectively.

Freedom thus ceases to be an abstract condition and becomes an ontological possibility: the possibility for a being to realize that it is the creator of meaning, that its institutions, values, and forms of life are its own constructions, and that they can be reflected upon and transformed. This freedom is not given but inherent in Being itself (Castoriadis, 1998). Ultimately, Castoriadis’ ontology of creation is, at its core, an ontology of freedom – one that still invites reflection on how it might resonate with contemporary debates in political ontology and critical theory.

Bibliography

Arnason, J. P. (1989). The Imaginary Constitution of Modernity. European Journal of Social Theory, 2(1), 1–20.

Castoriadis, C. (1991). Philosophy, Politics, Autonomy. Oxford University Press.

Castoriadis, C. (1998). The Imaginary Institution of Society. MIT Press.

Castoriadis, C. (2003). The rising tide of insignificancy (The big sleep) [Electronic edition].

Castoriadis, C. (2007). Figures of the Thinkable. Stanford University Press.

Habermas, J. (1984). The Theory of Communicative Action: Reason and the Rationalization of Society. Beacon Press.

Lefort, C. (1986). The Political Forms of Modern Society. MIT Press.

Taylor, C. (2004). Modern Social Imaginaries. Duke University Press.

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The assassination of Brian Thompson, CEO of UnitedHealthcare, is an occasion to open new discussions regarding the nature of revolutionary action and the methods of social change. Thompson, as a symbol of the barbarity of a system that prioritizes profit over human life, was the target of an extreme and individualistic means of resistance. But can we characterize this act as revolutionary? The answer can be found in a thorough analysis of the relationship between ends and means, as well as in the exploration of the concept of the creative dimension of revolution.

The reproduction of authoritarian logic

The act of the murderer, Mangione, is nothing more than a reflection of the instrumental logic that dominates the capitalist system. This logic, according to critical theory and thinkers such as Horkheimer and Adorno, is characterized by the removal of morality from the process of action. Instrumental thinking transforms man into a willless means, degrading the very nature of human existence. Moreover, according to thinkers such as Marcuse, capitalism itself is the one that, in its attempt to maximize performance, promotes a culture that ignores the inherent value of man.

Mangione’s violence, in the name of alleged resistance, fits into this framework. The end, that is, the supposed deconstruction of an inhuman system, sanctifies the means, making murder acceptable. However, as thinking subjects, we cannot help but perceive that the end and the means are interrelated. Means based on violence cannot create freedom. Instead, they promote fear, oppression, and the reproduction of the very logic of domination that they claim to reject.

The failure to grasp the creative dimension of the revolutionary process

Revolution is not a process of destruction. Or at least it is not only or primarily that. It is, first and foremost, a creative act aimed at establishing new institutions and values. Castoriadis, in “The Imaginary Institution of Society,” emphasized just this; social change presupposes the emergence of a new imaginary, one that transcends old patterns of power. The assassination of Thompson, and every Thompson, fails miserably to propose or establish any positive alternative vision. On the contrary, such acts function as a tool for reinforcing existing repression, providing the dominant system with the alibi of fear.

The great political philosopher, Hannah Arendt, in her “On Violence” sees violence in turn as a means that always undermines true political creation. In this context, Mangione’s act is not a political action, as it lacks the necessary collectivity and the ability to inspire positive change. It was an act of instrumental logic, trapped in a cycle of authoritarianism and destruction.

The tendency to heroize such acts by much of the wider movement is equally problematic. In the philosophy of autonomy, heroism is a form of power that undermines collective creation. As Nietzsche demonstrated in his critique of slave morality, the exaltation of the hero leads to the reproduction of structures of dependence. The revolution towards an autonomous, democratic society cannot be based on “great men” but on conscious collective social self-establishment.

The heroization of Mangione, therefore, is the acceptance of an authoritarian model for change that is opposed to the democratic process. Acts of individual revenge, however fanciful they may seem to some, are not the essence of the revolutionary process. Real revolution is a collective effort that rejects violence and highlights creativity as a fundamental principle.

The ineffectiveness of violence and the fantasy of capitalism

Furthermore, Thompson’s murder fails not only morally, but also strategically. Capitalism, as Marx himself analyzed, is a system that incorporates and assimilates violence, transforming it into a tool for strengthening its dominance. The murder of an individual, however symbolic, does not affect the institutional and philosophical foundations of the system. On the contrary, it reinforces the imaginary of security, which is used to legitimize repression.

What is required is therefore a radical change in the imaginary that underpins society. This change is not instantaneous, nor the result of individual actions. It is a continuous process that requires the participation and consciousness of the many. Thompson’s assassination was not revolutionary because it did not in the slightest challenge the structures that raised him. On the contrary, it reinforced them, offering the system new reasons and excuses for repression.

The real revolution is a preimaginative process of creating politics (Zapatistas)

Freedom, this rather arbitrary concept, is not only the absence of oppression, nor the ability to kill the class enemy, but active participation in the formation of society. This means that the revolution must focus on the foundation of new institutions, on the creation of a society based on autonomy and solidarity. Violence is the tool of those who cannot imagine anything beyond destruction. The real revolution is the rejection of this logic and the adoption of a creative attitude that recognizes that change is not simply the abolition of the old, but the creation of the new.

In this context, the concept of preimagining is introduced. Preimagining, as a concept and practice, is the core of real revolutionary action, rejecting violence and highlighting creativity. The Zapatistas of Mexico are a living example of this philosophy. Rather than limiting themselves to acts of revenge or destruction, they created autonomous communities based on the principles of direct democracy, equality, and collective participation.

Their action, while initially involving armed resistance, has evolved into an ongoing process of envisioning an alternative model of society. As they themselves emphasize, their revolution is not simply about overthrowing the existing regime, but about establishing a new life that embodies dignity, cooperation, and care for nature. This vision highlights how revolution can be creative and inspire collectivism, rather than reinforcing the logic of competition and domination that governs the capitalist imaginary.

Unlike Thompson’s assassination, which reinforced existing structures of oppression, the Zapatistas’ portrayal offers a model for how social change can occur through collective, creative, and nonviolent processes.

See also: Direct Democracy: Exploring the Ideas of Cornelius Castoriadis

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In traditional philosophical thought, the subject occupied a stable position, linking autonomy, rationality and moral action. The “ego” perceived itself as a central entity that remained constant in time and space, while the world around it, nature, society, could change. This stability was fundamental for the constitution of identity and subjectivity. For example, Descartes, with the famous “cogito ergo sum” (I think, therefore I am), defines the subject as an autonomous, enduring and self-existent substance (res cogitans). Descartes’ “ego” is the core of the subject, which, through thought, remains stable and unchanging. Later, Kant believed that the subject can transcend external conditions through “pure reason,” which allows him to determine his moral actions based on the categorical imperative, regardless of empirical or material influences.

However, with the advent of modernity and the subsequent deconstruction of “grand narratives” (Lyotard, 1994), the subject found itself radically challenged. This crisis of subjectivity is not limited to the existential crisis of the subject; on the contrary, it goes deeper and constitutes a crisis with a political dimension, since it affects the ability of individuals to act as autonomous beings in the collective institution of society (Castoriadis, 1978). Modern man does not only experience alienation from himself, but also alienation from the social and political processes that determine his life. The “Ego” is lost in the labyrinth.

The heteronomy of the market and the role of technology in shaping subjectivity

The market is one of the main institutions that lead the modern subject to a state of heteronomy. According to Castoriadis (1978), the capitalist imaginary meaning of “endless growth” shapes the value system of modern society, defining human existence through consumption. The individual is no longer autonomous, but a hetero-determined subject who depends on the laws of the market.

However, sterile consumption is not limited to material goods, but extends to experiences, relationships and the very way of life. Guy Debord (1994) describes this situation as a “society of the spectacle”, where people live through images and symbolic representations, distant from real life. The subject becomes a spectator in the theater of his life, while his desires and values ​​are shaped by the buzzwords of advertising and the entertainment industry. This in turn leads to a kind of consumer alienation, where the desires and needs of the individual are not his own, but products of external imposition. The subject does not recognize his own alienation and lives in a vicious circle of unfulfilled desires.

At the same time, the role of technology is also central to understanding the crisis of subjectivity. Castoriadis (1978) refers to the dominance of “technocratic logic”, which reduces all problems of society to technical issues, thus removing the political dimension of decisions. The citizen ceases to actively participate in the institution of society and is replaced by so-called “experts”.

New information technologies (such as algorithmic platforms, artificial intelligence, etc.) have the potential to influence subjectivity in subtle ways. As Shoshanna Zuboff (2023) aptly writes, the “capitalist surveillance system” constantly records and controls users’ preferences through data. Then, specialized algorithms, based on this data, shape the subject’s choices and direct them along predetermined paths. This “algorithmic control” is linked to the alienation of the subject, since it limits their ability to self-determine and self-reflect.

The Existential Void as the Collapse of Grand Narratives

The collapse of “grand narratives” in postmodernity, as Lyotard (1994) argued, led to the inability of the subject to find meaning in his life. The term “grand narratives” refers to the loss of trust in the systems of meaning that offered guidelines for society and the individual. Examples of such narratives are the ideologies of the Enlightenment, Marxism, but also traditional religious worldviews, which presented comprehensive explanations for the life, history and future of humanity.

These grand narratives were for centuries the foundation of subjective stability. Through them, the individual could find a purpose in his life, define his identity and understand his place in the world. For example, the Enlightenment introduced a belief in progress, rational thought, and the autonomy of the individual. Marxism, on the other hand, promised the liberation of man from exploitation and the construction of a just classless society. Finally, religions have historically provided metaphysical explanations for existence, offering solace through belief in a higher power and the promise of an afterlife and bliss.

However, Lyotard (1994) argues that in postmodernity, these narratives have lost their credibility. Scientific challenge, philosophical deconstruction (such as that of Derrida), and the realization of practical failure (such as communist or neoliberal regimes) have shown that these narratives were not as neutral and true as they were presented. The supposed “neutrality” of science has been revealed as a tool of power, as seen in colonialism, technocracy and the environmental destruction caused by the logic of development.

However, if the collective stories that once gave meaning to human life have been dissolved, then the individual is called upon to create his own meaning on his own. In postmodernity, the individual assumes the role of the autonomous constructor of his identity, but without having any stable foundation. In this context, the subject is confronted with uncertainty, gets lost in the inflation of information and finally, as Zygmunt Bauman (2013) says, turns into a “fluid subject” demonstrating that his identity is constantly changing depending on the conditions of each era. The individual now understands that he must seek an internal center of gravity, an “inner guide”, in order to define himself. However, this is not an easy task. The autonomy of the modern individual is both a burden and a challenge, as the subject must constantly choose the meaning of his existence. Where in the past, his identity was associated with clear roles such as “worker”, “Christian”, “citizen” etc., in postmodernity, the subject is called to constantly create himself.

Castoriadis offers an alternative, optimistic perspective on the crisis of subjectivity. While he clearly recognizes the deconstruction of grand narratives, he does not end up with Lyotard’s nihilism. On the contrary, he argues that the subject can achieve a radical autonomy, creating his own values ​​through collective self-institution (Castoriadis, 1978). The thinker argues that the subject must cease to rely on prefabricated narratives and become a co-creator of society and his own identity. This possibility, however, requires a radical change in the anthropological type, namely the emergence of an autonomous human being; not as an ideal or abstract subject, but as an existing and historically contingent project, which stems from the very possibility of social self-institution.

The Collective Overman?

Castoriadis’s concept of the “autonomous man” can be seen as a collective reinterpretation of Friedrich Nietzsche’s Overman. A philosophical shift that highlights the role of collective creation in the constitution of the autonomy of the subject. The Overman, as introduced by Nietzsche, is the personification of the creative power that emerges through the collapse of the metaphysical order and the recognition of the “death of God” (Nietzsche, 1883/1995). Rejecting the resentment and servile morality of the Christian tradition, Nietzsche proposes a type of man who creates new values ​​and embodies the will to power, living beyond the opposition of good and evil (Reginster, 2006). In the concept of the Overman, however, autonomy is completely individual, drawing its power from individual will and the overcoming of nihilism, without requiring collective recognition or participation.

In contrast, Castoriadis, through his work, proposes a radically different project for autonomy. For him, autonomy is not an individual state but a collective process. The autonomous person is given meaning and exists within the framework of a society that recognizes its ability to create and transform its institutions and meanings, through the social imaginary (Castoriadis, 1978). Autonomy, here, is not an individual overcoming of social boundaries, but a collective capacity to recognize institutions as human creations and to subject them to reflective criticism.

What makes the autonomous subject a collective reinterpretation of the Overman is the rejection of loneliness and distancing from society, characteristics that clearly permeate the Nietzschean vision. The Overman embodies an absolute autonomy that does not need collectivity to create new values. In contrast, Castoriadis places autonomy in the realm of the social imagination, a process where meaning and values ​​are produced through collective dialogue and participatory action (Arnason, 2001).

At the same time, the philosophical dimension of transcendence differentiates the two approaches. In Nietzsche, the transcendence of traditional values ​​and institutions is the result of the individual will to power, which is driven by the personal need to create meaning. In Castoriadis, transcendence emerges through reflective critique and collective action, making autonomy a continuous process of questioning and re-creating social institutions. Here, democracy becomes the space within which autonomy can be realized, something that is absent from Nietzschean thought.

This opposition, ultimately, reflects the difference between the individual and collective dimensions of autonomy. While the Overman proposes the solitary transcendence of man who lives beyond social conventions, the autonomous man is based on the recognition of society as a field of creation and questioning. Nietzsche rejects collective action as limiting for individual creativity, while Castoriadis includes it as a condition for the very existence of autonomy. Castoriadis’s thought highlights the importance of democratic process, dialogue, and social imagination in the construction of human freedom, proposing a way of understanding autonomy that recognizes the reflective capacity of society as fundamental to human creativity. Ultimately, Castoriadis’ ideas lend an optimistic perspective to an otherwise bleak landscape.

In conclusion

While the postmodern era highlights the deconstruction of fixed identities and narratives, this fluidity can be an opportunity for the creation of a new anthropological type. The transition from heteronomy to autonomy, both at the individual and collective levels, requires a paradigm shift in the perception of the self and society. The possibility for radical autonomy and self-establishment is real, but it requires a profound transformation of human consciousness and practice. The new anthropological type that must emerge, the autonomous human, embodies this challenge, linking individual self-knowledge with collective action.

Overcoming the crisis of subjectivity, therefore, does not lie in returning to traditional narratives or in absolute Nietzschean individuality, but in developing a new quality that combines critical thinking, collectivity, and creativity. The contemporary crisis of meaning, although painful, can play a catalytic role for a more meaningful and authentic existence on both a personal and a social level.

Bibliography

Arnason, J. P. (2001). The Imaginary Constitution of Modernity: Cornelius Castoriadis. European Journal of Social Theory, 4(4), 351–364.

Bauman, Z. (2013). Liquid modernity.

Castoriadis, C. (1978). The Imaginary Institution of Society.

Debord, G. (2016). Η Κοινωνία του Θεάματος.

Lyotard, J. F. (1994). The postmodern condition. The postmodern turn: new perspectives on modern theory, 27-38.

Nietzsche, F. (1883/2008). Τάδε έφη Ζαρατούστρα.

Reginster, B. (2006). The Affirmation of Life: Nietzsche on Overcoming Nihilism.

Zuboff, S. (2023). The age of surveillance capitalism. In Social theory re-wired (pp. 203-213).

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The imaginary institution of nature and the ecological dimension of autonomy

Technology and Emancipation: A Critical Approach

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The ecological crisis and the need for a new way of viewing the relationship between humans and the natural world are issues that preoccupied both Cornelius Castoriadis and Murray Bookchin, two of the most important thinkers of the 20th century. Despite the differences in their approach, both thinkers focus on the necessity of a radical reorganization of the way in which societies perceive nature. Bookchin, with his theory of social ecology, argues that the ecological crisis is a product of the hierarchical and oppressive social structures that characterize the modern world. Castoriadis, on the other hand, through his theory of autonomy and imaginary institution, proposes a more profound change in the fundamental values ​​and meanings that compose social life, emphasizing that the ecological crisis is a symptom of the broader cultural crisis that permeates the modern world. The combined analysis of the two theories can offer a comprehensive approach to nature and ecology, laying the foundation for the creation of a sustainable and autonomous society.

The imaginary institution of nature

The imaginary institution of nature is a crucial point for understanding not only the ecological crisis but also the very social and political organization of contemporary Western societies.

But what do we mean by the term “imaginary institution of nature”?

Cornelius Castoriadis, the proponent of the concept of the imaginary, through his critique of the Western metaphysical tradition, brings to the fore the historicity and social construction of nature as an object, institutionalized through the imaginary of societies. In modernity, nature ceases to be a living organism – as, for example, the ancient Greeks understood it through the term “cosmos” or the Eastern philosophies as a whole – and is transformed into a mechanistic space, a stripped “resource” for exploitation. Man, motivated by the Cartesian imaginary of the subject-object distinction, becomes “master and possessor” of nature (Descartes, 1637/2005), alienating himself from it and from his vital connection with it.

This alienation is not a natural evolution of human thought, but is the result of specific historical and cultural processes. The imaginary institutionalization of nature in the Western world is linked to the rise of the capitalist economy and the instrumentalization of human action through technology. This institutionalization is based on the “unlimited expansion of rationality”, where everything natural or human becomes an object of rationalization and domination (Castoriadis, 1999 a).

The recognition of nature as an institutionalized category deconstructs the essentialist approach that treats it as an external reality. In this context, Castoriadis proposes an alternative imaginary institution, where nature is reintegrated into the collective and individual imaginary, as a space of coexistence and creativity and not as an object of exploitation. Here, autonomy comes to the fore: society is called upon to reflect on and recreate its relationship with nature, founding new institutions based on respect and reciprocity.

Ecological Crisis and Technocracy: Castoriadis’ Critique

The ecological crisis, then, is not a simple set of environmental problems, as many ecological movements and activists perceive it. It is a symptom of a profound deregulation of the imaginary and the institutionalized logic of Western society. The core of the crisis lies in the dynamics of technocracy, whose logic is inherently alienating.

Technocratic thought sees nature as nothing more than a problem to be solved through technical means. Furthermore, the philosophy of sovereignty that permeates modern society leads to the annihilation of the natural world in the name of “progress.” This logic emerges through the combination of scientific thought and the capitalist pursuit of profit, producing a double alienation: both of man from nature and from human subjectivity itself (Castoriadis, 1999 b).

At the same time, technocracy cannot respond to ecological challenges because, of course, it remains trapped in precisely this logic that gave rise to the crisis. The ecological crisis requires a radical questioning of the imaginary of sovereignty and uncontrolled development. In this light, Castoriadis (1978) emphasizes the need for a different way of thinking, where political action and collective reflection will pave the way for a substantial direct democratic reorganization of social life.

Castoriadis and Bookchin Discussion: Ecology and Democracy

The connection of ecology with democracy is a crucial point, both in the thought of Castoriadis and in that of Murray Bookchin. Although the two thinkers start from different philosophical traditions, they converge on the need for a radical revision of the way in which societies are organized and perceive their relationship with nature. However, their differences in the way they approach the concept of autonomy and the position of the ecological issue highlight interesting philosophical contrasts.

Bookchin, through his work and especially in social ecology, argues that the ecological crisis is inextricably linked to hierarchical structures and political inequality. He sees the domination of man over nature as an extension of the domination of man over man (Bookchin, 1982). For the American thinker, the solution lies not only in protecting the environment through technocratic measures, but in the radically transformative power of direct democracy. His social ecology rejects both the one-dimensional development of technology and the idea of ​​nature as independent of society.

Castoriadis, for his part, emphasizes the imaginary dimension of the human relationship with nature and the centrality of autonomy as a prerequisite for any ecological solution. Democracy, for Castoriadis, is not simply a decision-making process, but a total reconstruction of the way in which people make sense of the world and their role in it. The ecological crisis, therefore, is not only a question of social hierarchies, as Bookchin argues, but also the result of a fundamental alienation of man from nature, but also from himself.

Where Bookchin proposes institutional change through direct democracy, Castoriadis introduces the deeper need to subvert the imaginary that legitimizes the logic of sovereignty. For Bookchin, nature and society are dialectically connected, but for Castoriadis, this connection remains unattainable without the human capacity to reflect on its institutions and values. Collective reflection and critical autonomy are the key to challenging the instrumental and technocratic view of nature.

Democracy, according to Castoriadis, acquires an ecological dimension when the citizen becomes a co-creator of social and environmental contexts, rather than treating nature as an external category. This approach goes beyond Bookchin, as it emphasizes that no institutional change can be sustainable without the renewal of the human imaginary. The human-nature relationship, therefore, is both a political and an ontological challenge, requiring a new way of being and acting.

Revisiting Bookchin: Critique and Extension through Castoriadis’ Thought

Bookchin proposes the creation of an eco-communitarian society based on the principle of rational interdependence of humans and nature (Bookchin, 2023). While this view is particularly important for connecting the ecological issue to democracy, it limits the possibility of transformation to the level of institutional change. According to Castoriadis, institutions are products of imaginary institutionalization, and therefore any change at the level of institutions requires a radical revision of the way in which we make sense of our social and physical existence.

Bookchin treats nature as a system with inherent “ecological principles” that can guide social transformation. In contrast, Castoriadis sees nature as open and indeterminate, an abyss of meaning that does not impose any specific social structure. This means that values ​​and practices related to nature cannot depend solely on “natural laws” but require a continuous critical and creative process (Castoriadis, 1978).

Thus, where Bookchin proposes a new social organization, Castoriadis argues that the very imaginary institution of nature as a tool or object to be exploited must be deconstructed. According to Castoriadis, modernity is characterized by an instrumental conception of nature, which is the product of the imaginary domination of economic and technological rationality. Bookchin does not give sufficient emphasis to this fundamental dimension of the imaginary, which limits his theory to the level of practical rather than ontological changes.

The Castoriadian approach can extend Bookchin’s theory by incorporating the dimension of autonomy as a prerequisite for any substantial ecological change. Reflection on the very institutions and values ​​of society is the only path to liberation from the imaginary constructions that legitimize the destruction of nature. Thus, while Bookchin proposes an institutional return to the harmony of nature and society, Castoriadis goes deeper, proposing a total reconstruction of the imaginary that gives meaning to this relationship.

Towards an Alternative Imaginary Institution: Autonomy and the Human-Nature Relationship

We have seen that the contemporary imaginary institutionalization of capitalism (but also of Marxism) perceives nature as an unlimited resource that can be consumed in the context of perpetual development. This perception is not simply economic, but deeply ontological, as it reproduces a type of human who sees the world instrumentally, cut off from its natural basis (Latouche, 2009). Castoriadis argues that transcending this logic requires the creation of a new anthropological type, a subject who recognizes himself as part of a larger ecological and social whole.

In this context, autonomy includes the recognition of nature as a value in itself, independent of human needs. In an autonomous society, the human-nature relationship is not one of domination but of symbiosis and respect. Such a relationship, however, is only possible when societies abandon the logics of instrumental domination and turn towards a more substantial and meaningful understanding of the world.

In conclusion, the refoundation of the imaginary concerns not only nature but also man himself. Change cannot be limited to external reforms but must include a profound transformation of the anthropological type that has developed in modernity. This new type of human being must combine the capacity for autonomy with a sense of collective responsibility towards the world. A new alternative imaginary institution involves the cultivation of a new way of being, where autonomy and ecology are not treated as separate spheres but as deeply intertwined. In this context, man is not a conqueror of nature but a part of it, acting as a co-creator of a sustainable world. The crisis, therefore, is not simply a catastrophe but also an opportunity for the foundation of a new social and ontological order.

Bibliography

Castoriadis, C. (1978). The Imaginary Institution of Society. Athens: Kedros.

Castoriadis, C. (1999 a). The Crossroads of the Labyrinth. Athens: Ypsilon.

Castoriadis, C. (1999 b). A world in fragments. Athens: Ypsilon.

Descartes, R. (2005). Discourse on Method and the Meditations. Penguin UK.

Bookchin, M. (1982). The ecology of freedom.

Bookchin, M. (2023). Remaking Society: A New Ecological Politics. AK Press.

Latouche, S. (2009). Farewell to growth. Polity.

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Hydrocarbon Extraction: A Critique Through the Lens of Degrowth

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Introduction

Since the Enlightenment, technology has emerged as a tool that promises to liberate humans from ignorance and the limitations of nature. This belief in technological progress was strengthened during the Industrial Revolution, when productive power and mechanization were seen as liberating humans from physical fatigue and promoting human well-being (Castoriadis, 1978; Marcuse, 2020). This promise, however, came with a corresponding challenge: the relationship of human dependence on the very tools and machines they created.

The view that technology is a neutral tool and that its use depends only on the people who manage it is strong in public discourse and academic thought. According to this approach, technology in itself does not bear moral, political or social characteristics. These arise only when used within specific social conditions and institutional frameworks. However, this view is open to challenge and criticism. Technology depends on the social institutions that shape and govern it, and thus the relationship between humans and technology is neither simple nor unambiguous.

This article argues that technology, detached from a critical social and institutional reflection, does not fulfill its promise of emancipation. On the contrary, it can limit the ability of humans to self-determine, interact and actively participate in the formation of society. In an era where dependence on technological tools is constantly increasing, it is important to ask ourselves whether and how technology can truly serve humans, without binding them or alienating them from the essential content of their existence.

Background of the theory of neutrality

The notion that technology is neutral was largely embodied and cultivated from the 18th century onwards, through the philosophical and scientific developments of the Enlightenment (Habermas, 1993). The sciences brought to the fore the idea that knowledge and progress are possible only through objective study and impartial observation of the world. This trend reinforced the belief that technology, as an outcome of scientific knowledge, can be developed and utilized independently of social and moral values, that is, as a neutral tool.

The Industrial Revolution was a crucial stage in promoting the idea of ​​liberation through technology, as large production machines and the emerging industrial system promised to increase productivity and facilitate human labor (Marcuse, 2020). Technology as a means of liberating man from physical fatigue was subsequently seen as a means of improving the standard of living. On the basis of this view, societies accepted technological progress as an end in itself, without questioning its nature and role in relation to human values ​​and the needs of society.

However, this approach began to be criticized in the 20th century. Major scientific discoveries, especially information technologies and nuclear weapons, revealed that technology is neither isolated nor neutral, but is directly linked to the political and social structures that produce and direct it (Adorno & Horkheimer, 1996). Through the works of critical thinkers such as Horkheimer, Adorno and others, the neutrality of technology began to be deconstructed, and technology was recognized as a complex factor that influences and is influenced by political and social conditions. The emergence of this critical perspective raised the question: is technology truly neutral or does it embody social, political and ethical values ​​that influence structures of power and control?

The social dimension of technology

On a deeper analysis, one can observe that every technological development expresses the needs and priorities of the society that creates it. For example, the development of heavy industry in the early 20th century was closely linked to the demand of industrial states for productivity, exploitation of natural resources and strengthening of military power. Technology in this case served the increase of economic and military power, thus constituting not a neutral means but a tool that embodies the needs of the state and the market for control and imposition (Habermas, 1993).

At the same time, however, it would be a bold abstraction to consider that technology functions simply as a mirror of social institutions, as this would remove from it the dimension of shaping social structure and reshaping power relations. The spread of information and communication technologies is a typical example. These technologies have created new possibilities for communication, collaboration and access to knowledge, but at the same time they have allowed the expansion of mechanisms for controlling, monitoring and exploiting users (Foucault, 2011). A more specific example is the use of social networks and digital platforms, such as Facebook, Instagram and Twitter. On the one hand, these platforms provide new possibilities for communication, networking and information exchange, making participation in public debates and social initiatives more accessible; however, these same technologies allow the collection of personal data and the monitoring of users, which can be exploited for commercial or political purposes, controlling and directing their behavior. Thus, technology facilitates social hierarchies and the prevalence of specific forms of power.

We therefore understand that technology must be studied not only as a technical object but also as a phenomenon that influences and is influenced by the socio-historical environment. In the modern world, technology is usually driven by the pursuit of productivity and efficiency, reinforcing economic structures based on the exploitation of nature and growth without limits. Moreover, its development, especially in bureaucratic or centralized systems, is often used to reinforce power relations, distancing the citizen from the possibility of active and authentic participation in social processes.

At the same time, the idea that technological progress is equivalent to social and human emancipation is clearly misleading. The mere development of technology does not ensure a more just or free social system, as technology can just as easily be used to reinforce inequality, alienation and oppression. In fact, the connection of technological development with the logics of production and consumption reinforces coercion and the logic of exploitation, promoting an ideology of unlimited development without social or ecological constraints.

The need to reconsider technology through Autonomy

But could technology be a real means of emancipation? Personally, I believe so, but under very specific conditions, as we must proceed with a radical reexamination of the social meaning attributed to it. Technology does not develop in a vacuum, but is guided by imaginary meanings and collective projects that place it in specific cultural and value contexts. Society must therefore ask questions about what it seeks through technology and how it can be used as a means of real participation and authentic collective self-institution.

The concept of autonomy presupposes the ability of a society to shape and choose its own laws and institutions. Technology can become a vehicle for such social autonomy only if it is integrated into a framework where society takes responsibility for its choices and determines the orientation of technological development based on its values ​​and not on the anonymous market or centralized power structures. This approach expresses the view that social change, to be meaningful, must be based on a redefinition of collective goals and forms of political participation.

Furthermore, the pursuit of perpetual growth and efficiency, which dominates contemporary technological applications, should also be discussed as it reproduces an instrumental logic that sees the world as an object to be exploited. This logic is in conflict with autonomy, as it creates a relationship of dominance between humans and nature and reinforces structures of dependency and inequality. A redefinition of this relationship would require the institutional cultivation of a new meaning, where technology serves collective and sustainable goals, rather than promoting linear and perpetual accumulation.

The reshaping of technology is not simply a technical or economic issue, but a deeply political and cultural one, concerning the very autonomy of societies and their ability to self-establish themselves in harmony with the goals they themselves set.

Participatory Institutions as a Prerequisite for Emancipation

The institutional structure of a society is a key factor that can determine whether technology will function as a means of autonomy or heteronomy. Creating participatory institutions, where citizens have control and say in technological decisions, is essential to promoting an emancipatory use of technology. Active citizen participation in decision-making regarding technology and its structures can prevent the risk of concentration of expertise and power in a few hands and strengthen a true social democracy.

Current technological governance clearly operates in a way that excludes the participation of the wider society. The hierarchical configuration of technological governance institutions creates inequalities in knowledge and power, leading to technocratic control that often ignores collective needs. The need for a different model of governance is evident: a system where communities retain direct access to and control over technological applications and decisions that affect their lives. This framework reinforces the principles of autonomy, allowing collective will to co-shape the manner and purpose of technological development.

Technology has the potential to function as a network of collective cooperation, enhancing interaction and solidarity between citizens and communities. The creation of open, decentralized networks of knowledge and information can promote forms of horizontal governance and sharing of technology, giving people the opportunity to co-create and co-decide. Technology can thus be used to support communities that act collectively and self-determine, breaking down traditional power relations and centralized control.

To achieve truly democratic technology governance, societies must develop institutions and practices that facilitate decentralized participation and social control. These proposals include the creation of citizen assemblies to evaluate and guide technological development, the institutionalization of open-source structures that allow citizens to have full access to technology and the ability to contribute to its design and development, and the strengthening of technology education to reduce dependence on experts.

Challenges and Prerequisites

One of the main obstacles to the adoption of participatory institutions is the existing hierarchical power structures that prevail in many sectors. Technocratic logics, which want technology to be governed by professionals and experts, limit the ability of citizens to actively participate. In addition, the economic dimension of technological development is also an important factor. The commercial goals of technology companies often conflict with the needs of communities. The pursuit of profit can lead to innovations that serve only narrow interests, reinforcing inequality and social exclusion.

Education also plays a crucial role in the ability of citizens to actively participate in the technological process. Access to knowledge and understanding of technological processes must be accessible to everyone, regardless of social or economic status. This means that education programs are needed that focus not only on technical training, but also on critical thinking and analysis of the social impacts of technology (Habermas, 1993). Building a culture of participation and solidarity is a necessary condition for the success of participatory institutions (Castoriadis, 1978).

Perspectives on the Future of Technology and Empowerment

As technological innovations advance, it is important to consider the prospects they offer, as well as the challenges they may pose.

Artificial intelligence is one of the most radical innovations of our time, with the potential to drastically change the way we interact with technology. While its applications can offer significant benefits, such as automating everyday processes and improving efficiency, they also raise serious ethical questions.

The reliance on algorithms for decision-making, from managing personal data to autonomous driving, requires a critical dialogue about power and responsibility. How can we ensure that artificial intelligence is used to promote social justice and not to reproduce inequalities? The vision of “technology for the good of all” must be accompanied by transparency, accountability and recognition of the need for direct human intervention and oversight.

Social movements have proven resilient in using technology as a means of organizing and mobilizing. With the continued development of digital tools, citizens can take action at the local and international levels, expanding their possibilities for participation. The development of social networks allows the dissemination of information and the organization of actions at an unprecedented speed. However, this assistance comes with the challenges of digital illiteracy and fake news. Digital literacy education is essential to ensure that citizens can make critical use of the tools at their disposal. In today’s digital world, critical thinking and the reexamination of technological achievements are essential. Societies need to reexamine the impact of technologies on their lives and ensure that technology works to benefit social goals. This ongoing critical process is important for developing an ethical and responsible orientation towards technology that supports empowerment and social justice.

Conclusions

Technology, as presented, is not a neutral tool; it embodies and reflects the needs, values, and priorities of the social groups and institutions that shape and use it. Each technological innovation brings to light specific sets of values, which, depending on the context of use, can strengthen or weaken different social groups. Technology affects not only daily life, but also the structure and organization of society, as it reshapes the way we communicate, work, and interact. It is therefore crucial to approach technological progress with a critical attitude, aware of the positive and negative consequences it can have on social cohesion, economic equality and cultural expression.

The need for a critical and responsible framework for the development of technology is becoming increasingly evident as its impacts become deeper and wider. The uncritical acceptance of technology as an inevitable advance hides the risk of alienating individuals from society, due to the increasing dependence on technological means that are not accessible or understandable to everyone. Social inequalities may widen when access to new technologies remains a privilege of specific groups, instead of promoting fair and equal access for all.

Technology is not an end in itself, but a tool that can indeed contribute to the promotion of human well-being and social justice. The success of this idea, however, depends on our own will and ability to incorporate collective values ​​into the development and use of technologies.

Bibliography

Castoriadis, K. (1978). The Imaginary Institution of Society. Athens: Kedros.

Adorno, T. W., & Horkheimer, M. (1996). Dialectic of Enlightenment. Philosophical Excerpts. Athens: Nisos Publications.

Foucault, M. (2011). Surveillance and Punishment. The Birth of the Prison. Athens: Plethron.

Habermas, J. (1993). The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity. Twelve Traditions. Athens: Alexandria.

Marcuse, H. (2020). The One-Dimensional Man. Athens: Pedio Publications.

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The linguistic turn is a major turning point in 20th-century philosophy, as it brought the concept of language to the forefront as a fundamental dimension of human knowledge and social practice. It refers to a significant shift in philosophical understanding, arguing that philosophy is neither an empirical science nor a supra-empirical study of reality. Instead, it is a conceptual approach based on logic, aiming to analyze the complex relationships between philosophically significant concepts, as they arise from linguistic use.

Although the concept began with the publication of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus in 1921, the term was introduced by Richard Rorty in 1967. The linguistic turn describes the move away from traditional philosophical views that viewed language as a simple tool for describing reality and the promotion of the notion that language constructs our own experience of the world. Thinkers such as Ludwig Wittgenstein and the structuralists and post-structuralists, especially Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida, shaped this problematic, redefining the role of language in the construction of social practices, institutions and meaning.

Within this context, the thought of Cornelius Castoriadis, although not directly aligned with this direction, presents important commonalities but also notable differences. Castoriadis approached social and political becoming through the concept of “imaginary institutionalization” and autonomy, emphasizing the creative dimension of the radical imaginary and the ability of people to self-institutionalize. For this reason, it is crucial to investigate whether and how the linguistic turn is found in his work, focusing on the analogies and divergences with the central concepts of the philosophy of language.

The linguistic turn in philosophy: From Saussure to Wittgenstein and Foucault

The linguistic turn, founded on the thought of Ferdinand de Saussure, defines language as a system of signs consisting of the signifier and the signified. Saussure (1979) argued that the relationship between signifier and signified is arbitrary, while language functions as a closed system of symbols, which is developed through collective conventions. This approach formed the basis of structuralism, crucially influencing the subsequent development of linguistics and the social sciences.

At the same time, Wittgenstein (1977), with the concept of “language games”, emphasized that the meaning of words is determined by their use in specific social contexts, underlining the function of language and social practice. Such language games are, for example, the language of Christians, or of scientists, the everyday language we use in our communication, the philosophical language, etc.

To make these more understandable, let us contrast the term “faith” between Christian language and everyday language.

In the Christian context, “faith” refers to a deep and unwavering trust in God and the teachings of Jesus Christ. It is not just a belief, but an inner certainty based on spiritual experience and acceptance of the divine plan. Example: “Faith in Christ leads us to salvation.” The word “faith” here has a theological meaning, referring to an existential relationship with God.

On the contrary, in its everyday use, the word “faith” can simply mean trust in someone or something, without necessarily involving a theological or spiritual dimension. Example: “I have faith in my companions that they will help me.” Here, the word “faith” refers to a simple human trust and does not have the weight of religious faith.

With this example, one understands that the same word can carry very different meanings depending on the context of its use, depending on whether this is religious or everyday.

While Wittgenstein focused on linguistic conventions and language games, Foucault (2017) went deeper and developed a more dynamic approach to language as a means of controlling and shaping reality. In his work “The Archaeology of Knowledge”, he argues that knowledge is not something neutral or objective, but is shaped and controlled through “discourses”, which are sets of statements related to power. Discourses constitute the framework within which objects of knowledge are created and given meaning, such as mental health, crime, gender and sexuality.

This means that language is not simply a means that people use to communicate and describe the world, but an active tool that contributes to the formation of knowledge and the embodiment of specific forms of power. Every discourse includes rules and procedures that determine what can be said, who can say it, and under what conditions it is accepted as true or valid. Thus, linguistic conventions are embedded in a network of power, as certain topics become objects of public discussion or research, while others are excluded or silenced. Foucault shows how institutions (e.g., the school, the judicial system, the hospital) and the discourses that surround them regulate who has the power to produce knowledge and control it (Foucault, 2017).

Language and the Imaginary in the Work of Cornelius Castoriadis

Castoriadis is one of the most important thinkers of the 20th century, with his theory of the imaginary institutionalization of society being a fundamental axis of his thought. Within the framework of this theory, he examines the relationship between society, institutions, meanings, and language. The concept of “imaginary institutionalization” refers to the way in which societies create their own system of values, rules, and symbolic forms, which guides the lives of their members. This system is not simply the result of logical organization or objective conditions, but a product of human imagination (Castoriadis, 1978).

According to Castoriadis, every society forms an “imaginary universe” or a set of imaginary forms and meanings that determine the way in which people perceive and organize their world. These imaginary forms, or “social imaginary meanings”, have no reference to “objective” reality, but function as frames of meaning that guide human activities, moral values ​​and social structures. Institutions, norms and values, therefore, do not arise automatically from the nature of people or some historical necessity, but are produced by this imaginary institutionalization (Castoriadis, 1978). For example, concepts such as the state, law, justice, or religion are not something “natural” or universal. Each society produces its own particular meanings, which are differentiated from the corresponding meanings of other societies.

Castoriadis here radically differs from the perception of the linguistic turn, as he does not consider language as a primary and determining element of social and political creation. His criticism focuses on the fact that linguistic analysis, although important, is limited to the sphere of expression and cannot explain the source of human creativity, which is located in the imaginary dimension. According to Castoriadis (1999), the emphasis on language by thinkers of the linguistic turn, such as Wittgenstein and Derrida, distances them from the question of creation and autonomy. Language, although necessary for the constitution of social forms, is not the source of creativity. Society is not constituted simply through linguistic systems, but through an ever-evolving process of imaginative institutionalization, in which people create new social forms and meanings beyond linguistic conventions.

This dimension of human creativity, which transcends language, is central to Castoriadis’s theory of autonomy. Autonomy, for the thinker, is not only the capacity to formulate new linguistic meanings or reinterpret existing ones, but the capacity to recreate the very institutions and systems that define our lives. Instead of language, the primary force for the creation of social forms and institutions is what Castoriadis calls the “radical imaginary.” This concept suggests a creative force that operates beyond logic or language. The radical imaginary is the source of new forms and structures that did not exist before and that cannot be fully explained in terms of existing logical or linguistic structures. It is the creative capacity of people to form new ideas, institutions, and social structures that redefine the context in which they live (Castoriadis, 1978).

Here, Castoriadis’s difference with the linguistic turn also becomes particularly clear. While philosophers of the linguistic turn see language as the basic tool for constructing meaning, Castoriadis considers that the creation of meaning pre-exists language. Language is the medium through which imaginary meanings are expressed, but it is not their source. According to Castoriadis, the radical imaginary is what is responsible for the creation of all social forms, from the simplest to the most complex. It is what leads to the production of new forms of social organization, such as democracy or religion, and of institutions, such as laws, courts, or political ideologies. These forms and institutions acquire meaning through the imagination and are then expressed and reinforced through the language and symbolic forms used by each society (Castoriadis, 1978).

Furthermore, another important element is the timelessness of imaginary institutionalization. Every society, although it creates new forms and institutions, does not start from scratch. The imaginary institutionalization of each society involves the elaboration of previous social forms and institutions, which have been created in the past, and the formation of new forms based on them. This process of constant re-creation and revision is central to social change. In this context, the radical imaginary is not only a force of innovation, but also a force of feedback and reinterpretation of existing institutions. Societies are not static, but continually redefine the meaning of their institutions and forms of social organization through this process. Imaginary institutionalization constantly creates new meanings, thus allowing for social evolution and transformation (Castoriadis, 1978). This approach highlights the need to examine social structures through the prism of historical development and cultural heritage, something that can be ignored in the theory of the linguistic turn, which focuses mainly on linguistic representation and the importance of language in the creation of social reality.

Conclusion

The thought of Cornelius Castoriadis constitutes a crucial contribution to philosophy and social theory, especially in the sense of the “imaginary institutionalization of society”. In contrast to the linguistic turn, which clearly places language at the center of human knowledge and social formation, Castoriadis prioritizes the imaginary dimension as a fundamental force of social creation. For Castoriadis, language is not the primary creative force, but simply a channel through which the imaginary creations of society are expressed and reinforced. The radical imaginary, as the thinker defines it, is the driving force behind the production of new forms of social organization and institutions, going beyond linguistic analysis and offering a more dynamic perception of autonomy at both the individual and collective levels.

The theory of imaginary institutionalization highlights the power of human creativity, which not only redefines social reality, but also restructures it through continuous processes of feedback and reinterpretation of institutions and values. This approach, which places imagination at the core of social creation, offers a substantive critique of the linguistic turn and leads us to a deeper understanding of human creativity and the autonomy of societies and individuals.

Bibliography
Kastoriadis, K. (1978). The Imaginary Institution of Society. Athens: Kedros.

Castoriadis, K. (1999). The Shattered World. Athens: Ypsilon.

Foucault, M. (2017). The Archaeology of Knowledge. Athens: PLETHRON

Saussure, F. de. (1979). Courses in General Linguistics. Athens: Papazisis.

Wittgenstein, L. (1977). Philosophical Investigations. Athens: Papazisis.

Post The linguistic turn and Castoriadis’ thought: Language as Practice and Imagination first showed at Elias Sekeris | Webspace.

By degrowth, we mean a form of society and economy that aims for the well-being of all and preserves the natural basis for life. To achieve degrowth, we need a fundamental transformation of our lives and a far-reaching cultural change. The dominant economic and social paradigm is that of “faster, higher, farther”. It is built on and motivates competition between people. This causes acceleration, stress and exclusion. Our economy destroys the natural basis of life. We are convinced that the common values ​​of a degrowth society should be care, solidarity and cooperation. Humanity must perceive itself as part of the planetary ecological system. Only in this way can a self-determined life with dignity for all be possible.

– Definition of degrowth from the degrowth.info platform

INTRODUCTION

The extraction of hydrocarbons, such as oil and natural gas, is a crucial factor in the global capitalist onslaught. However, the increased demand for energy has led to an intensification of mining activities, causing serious environmental and social impacts. The environmental impacts include water pollution, ecosystem destruction and increased greenhouse gas emissions, while the social impacts negatively affect local communities and especially indigenous populations.

Degrowth, as an alternative approach to traditional economic development, proposes a reduction in production and consumption in order to achieve a sustainable and just society (Kallis, 2018). This theory highlights the need for a revision of the values ​​of modern society, promoting self-sufficiency, solidarity and environmental protection. In this context, degrowth emphasizes the importance of renewable energy and local economies as means to achieve this goal.

This article analyzes hydrocarbon extraction through the theory of degrowth, examining its multi-level impacts and proposing alternative solutions that promote environmental sustainability and social justice. Through the exploration of the proposals of degrowth, the article highlights the importance of reducing dependence on hydrocarbons, promoting renewable energy sources and strengthening local communities as key strategies for addressing contemporary challenges.

THE THEORY OF DEGROWTH

The theory of degrowth emerged as a response to the environmental crisis and social inequality caused by economic growth (Latouche, 2013). The basic idea of ​​degrowth is to recognize the limits of growth and promote an economy that is not based on continuous GDP growth, but on improving the quality of life and environmental sustainability (Kallis et al., 2020). Serge Latouche, one of the main theorists of degrowth, points out that continued economic growth is incompatible with both the sustainable management of natural resources and social justice (Latouche, 2013).

The basic principles of degrowth include reexamining the values ​​of modern society, promoting austerity, strengthening the local economy, and decoupling well-being from economic growth. Latouche (2013) argues that the modern economy is based on an unlimited desire for consumption and production, which leads to environmental degradation and social inequality. Degrowth proposes a return to a simpler and more sustainable everyday life, where the quality of life is not determined by material abundance but by personal well-being and social cohesion. In order to achieve this, he has proposed a framework for degrowth based on eight basic principles, also known as “the 8 Rs”. These principles propose a radically different way of thinking and acting from the dominant economic model, promoting the reduction of consumption and production in favor of environmental sustainability and social justice. These principles are:

1. Re-evaluate (Réévaluer): It is about reviewing our values ​​and changing the mindset that is based on endless economic growth and consumption. We need to emphasize quality of life, well-being and ecological balance instead of continuous economic growth.
2. Reconceptualize (Reconceptualiser): Re-orientation is about changing our priorities and reorganizing society around new values ​​and goals. This includes decoupling well-being from material consumption and adopting sustainable practices in all areas of life.
3. Reconstructure (Reconstructurer): Reconstruction involves reshaping production and consumption systems to reduce environmental burdens and increase social justice. This, in our case, means moving from an economy based on hydrocarbons to one based on renewable energy sources.
4. Reduce (Réduire): Reduction refers to the reduction of production and consumption in order to reduce the environmental burden and ensure the sustainability of natural resources. This means less waste and more conscious consumption.
5. Reuse (Réutiliser): Reuse involves promoting the use of products for a longer period of time, through repair, remanufacturing and reuse, reducing the need for new products and the waste of natural resources.
6. Recycle (Recycler): Recycling refers to the processing and reuse of waste to produce new products. This helps to reduce the amount of waste and conserve natural resources.
7. Relocalise (Relocaliser): Relocalisation encourages the strengthening of local economies and the reduction of dependence on global markets. Promoting local production and consumption reduces the environmental impact of transport (ecological footprint) and strengthens the local economy and community.
8. Redistribution: Redistribution involves the redistribution of wealth and resources to reduce inequalities and ensure social justice. This means a more equitable distribution of goods and services, to ensure that everyone has access to those goods that are necessary to meet their basic needs.

IMPACTS OF HYDROCARBON EXTRACTION: THE CRITICISM OF DEGREE DEVELOPMENT

Hydrocarbon extraction – as stated at the beginning of this article – has significant environmental and social impacts, which in the vast majority exceed the benefits it provides. The critique of degrowth focuses on the negative consequences of this practice and the need for a more sustainable and equitable approach to energy policy.

A) Environmental Impacts

The environmental impacts of hydrocarbon extraction include water pollution, ecosystem destruction and greenhouse gas emissions. Oil spills, for example, have devastating consequences for marine life and coastal ecosystems (Jernelöv, 2010). In addition, the release of methane during the process of extracting and transporting natural gas contributes significantly to climate change (Howarth, 2014).

A typical example of these impacts is the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. The catastrophic oil spill occurred in 2010 after the explosion of the Deepwater Horizon platform, which belonged to BP (British Petroleum). The accident caused the leakage of millions of barrels of oil into the sea, with incalculable consequences for the environment.

The water pollution from the oil spill covered a huge area of ​​sea, coastal ecosystems were severely damaged by the oil and many species of marine organisms, such as fish, seabirds and sea turtles, were directly affected by the pollution. The toxic substances in the oil caused not only death but also reproductive problems in many species. In addition, the burning of oil and the cleanup processes released large amounts of greenhouse gases, thus contributing to climate change.

The Deepwater Horizon accident is one of the largest environmental accidents in history and highlights the serious impacts that hydrocarbon extraction can have on the environment. Efforts to restore the affected areas have been ongoing for years, but the long-term consequences remain.

Beyond the cases of accidents, however, degrowth argues that the continued exploitation of hydrocarbons is incompatible with the need to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and protect the environment. The reckless use of natural resources leads to depletion of reserves and environmental degradation, threatening the viability of ecosystems and the health of human communities (Latouche, 2013).

B) Social Impacts

The social impacts of hydrocarbon extraction are equally significant. Local communities are often displaced to make way for the extraction, losing access to traditional sources of income and land (Lertzman & Vredenburg, 2005). Economic inequality is exacerbated as the benefits of extraction accrue to investors and large companies, while the negative impacts mainly affect local and indigenous communities (Bebbington et al., 2008).

A typical example is the situation in the Amazon in Colombia, where oil extraction has led to significant social unrest. Local communities, mainly indigenous tribes living in remote areas of the Amazon, have been displaced to make way for the extraction. These communities are losing access to traditional sources of income, such as hunting, fishing and agriculture, and the quality of their land is deteriorating.

Furthermore, economic inequality is increasing as the benefits of hydrocarbon extraction accrue to investors and large oil companies, while local communities who experience the negative impacts, such as environmental pollution and the destruction of their ecosystems, do not see corresponding economic benefits. The effects of pollution and change in the local environment create further challenges for the health and well-being of these communities.

The example of the Amazon thus shows that extraction not only affects the environment, but also the social and economic balance of local communities. Degrowth suggests a more equitable distribution of resources and the empowerment of local populations. Strengthening local autonomy and promoting local economic activities can contribute to creating more resilient and self-sufficient communities, reducing dependence on mining and large corporations (Latouche, 2013).

C) Rethinking economic models

Degrowth therefore calls for a radical rethinking of economic development models, moving away from the traditional concept of continuous economic growth and towards sustainability and social justice (D’Alisa et al., 2015). The adoption of new models that promote collective well-being and sustainability is essential to achieve such a balanced and just society.

The basic idea behind this is that continuous economic growth cannot be sustainable and cannot continue indefinitely on our limited planet. Instead, degrowth proposes that quality of life and sustainability should be prioritized. This means that we need to rethink our economic models to focus on a better allocation of resources, reducing consumption and promoting social justice.

For example, Som Energía (We Are Energy) is a green energy consumer cooperative founded in 2010 in Girona, Spain, and has gained significant recognition for its self-organized approach to sustainable energy. The cooperative aims to promote the use of renewable energy sources and reduce dependence on fossil fuels. The cooperative operates on the principle of collective participation and energy justice. Its members contribute financially, participate in decisions, and invest in renewable energy installations, such as solar panels and wind farms. The profit from the sale of the energy produced is reinvested to expand the projects and strengthen the community.

Notably, Som Energía does not depend on government funding or subsidies, but relies solely on the contributions and participation of its members. This allows the cooperative to maintain its independence and focus on promoting sustainable and fair energy practices. The cooperative has also developed educational initiatives to promote ecological awareness and participation in energy, offering seminars and workshops for the public and other communities interested in following similar models. This is an excellent example of a self-organized and sustainable energy community, which shows how local initiatives can contribute to changing the energy landscape and freeing themselves from hydrocarbon dependence without even the need for state intervention.

Degrowth, therefore, proposes a new direction for our societies, focused on sustainability and quality of life, instead of unlimited economic growth. Examples like the above (and there are many of them!) show that it is possible to rebel against the dominant economic logic and promote models that incorporate these principles. Of course, for all this to happen, it is necessary to strengthen local communities, create solidarity networks, promote community participation and strengthen local cultural and social structures (Trainer, 2012). Furthermore, according to Latouche (2013), strengthening local communities can contribute to reducing social inequalities and promoting social cohesion, creating a more just and sustainable society.

CONCLUSION

The analysis of hydrocarbon extraction through the theory of degrowth highlights the serious environmental and social impacts of these activities. These impacts, such as water pollution, ecosystem destruction and displacement of local communities, outweigh the economic benefits, demonstrating the need for a change in approach to energy policy.

Degrowth proposes a radical revision of economic models, focused on sustainability, social justice and the empowerment of local communities. By promoting renewable energy sources and reducing dependence on hydrocarbons, it is possible to create more sustainable and equitable societies. Examples such as the Som Energía cooperative in Spain show that local initiatives can contribute significantly to achieving these goals, offering a model for building a more resilient and self-sufficient economy.

The transition to a society that promotes self-sufficiency, solidarity and environmental protection requires the cooperation of local communities, the strengthening of local networks and the promotion of community participation. The theory of degrowth can provide a framework for achieving these goals, emphasizing the importance of revising the values ​​of modern society and the need for a more equitable distribution of resources. In conclusion, degrowth suggests a necessary alternative approach, which can address contemporary challenges and create a sustainable and just future for all.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bebbington, A., Bury, J., & Humphreys Bebbington, D. (2008). Mining and social movements: struggles over livelihood and rural territorial development in the Andes. World Development, 36(12), 2888-2905.

D’Alisa, G., Demaria, F., & Kallis, G. (2015). Degrowth: A vocabulary for a new era. Routledge.

Howarth, R. W. (2014). A bridge to nowhere: methane emissions and the greenhouse gas footprint of natural gas. Energy Science & Engineering, 2(2), 47-60.

Jernelöv, A. (2010). The threats from oil spills: Now, then, and in the future. Ambio, 39(5-6), 353-366.

Kallis, G. (2018). Degrowth. Agenda Publishing.

Kallis, G., Kerschner, C., & Martinez-Alier, J. (2020). The economics of degrowth. Ecological Economics, 84, 172-180.

Latouche, S. (2013). Towards a society of lean abundance. Misconceptions and controversies surrounding degrowth. Athens: Colleagues’ Publications

Lertzman, D. A., & Vredenburg, H. (2005). Indigenous peoples, resource extraction and sustainable development: An ethical approach. Journal of Business Ethics, 56(3), 239-254.

Trainer, T. (2012). De-growth: Do you realize what it means? Futures, 44(6), 590-599.

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In an era of rampant commercialization of everything and escalating environmental destruction, it is more than necessary for us as a society to redefine our understanding of beaches and coastal areas in general, as well as our position and attitude towards them and their management.

Beaches are not tourist destinations, or plots of land for economic exploitation, on the contrary they are common resources that belong to all humanity and the natural world. This paradigm shift is necessary to promote their sustainable management and address the multifaceted negative impacts of overtourism.

Theoretical framework: Beaches as Commons

The concept of the Commons, as formulated by scholars such as Elinor Ostrom, or David Harvey, emphasizes collective ownership and management. Ostrom’s pioneering work on the governance of commons challenges Hardin’s (1968) “tragedy of the commons” narrative, which argues that there is no alternative but external intervention and that a common resource can only be sustainable when it is either controlled and regulated by the state or privatized.

In contrast to this one-dimensional view, Nobel laureate Ostrom, in her monumental 1990 work “The Governance of Commons,” demonstrated – through a wealth of examples from all over the world – that communities can effectively manage their resources through collective action and self-regulation (Ostrom, 2002). Furthermore, Bookchin’s social ecology extends this idea by linking environmental issues to social structures, advocating decentralized, community-based management of natural resources (Bookchin, 2016). Harvey (2006), for his part, criticizes the commodification of natural resources and advocates the recovery of the Commons as part of a broader struggle against the sweeping onslaught of neoliberalism.

The Tragedy of Overtourism

It is no secret that overtourism poses significant threats to coastal environments, resulting in a modern manifestation of the “tragedy of the commons”, the tragedy of overtourism. The huge influx of tourists to popular coastal destinations, as is the case in Greece, puts enormous pressure on local ecosystems, which manifests itself in various harmful ways, such as:

A) Environmental degradation

The increase in the number of tourists disrupts marine and coastal ecosystems. Pollution from waste, sewage, etc. contributes to the degradation of water quality, the destruction of marine habitats and also undermines the ecological functions of beaches such as the protection of biodiversity.

B) Erosion and habitat loss

Increased tourist traffic and the construction of tourist infrastructure also accelerate coastal erosion. As Hall (2001) characteristically writes about sand dunes, their destruction makes coastal areas more vulnerable to natural disasters such as storms and rising sea levels. This erosion not only threatens wildlife but also the human communities that depend on these ecosystems for their livelihoods.

C) Cultural erosion

The commercialization of beaches often marginalizes and fragments local communities. Traditional livelihoods, such as fishing, are undermined by the tourism economy, leading to socio-economic inequalities and loss of cultural heritage. As beaches are turned into commodities, local customs and practices are often sidelined in favor of activities that cater to thousands of tourists, resulting in cultural homogenization.

D) Economic inequality

While soft tourism can stimulate local economies, the all-inclusive overtourism observed in Greece, but also in general, mathematically leads to economic inequality. Profits from tourism benefit either foreign investors and multinational companies, or the “elite” of domestic capital, and not local populations, thus exacerbating social and economic inequalities. This dynamic can also create dependence on unstable tourism markets and displace traditional economic activities.

Towards sustainable beach management

To mitigate these negative impacts, it is essential in our opinion to adopt sustainable management practices that are rooted in the principles of the Commons. These include:

A) Community engagement

Empowering local communities to take an active role in the management and governance of beaches ensures that their knowledge and needs are prioritized in decision-making processes. Management by the community – for the community leads to more effective and culturally appropriate governance strategies.

B) Regulation and enforcement

Implementation of strict regulations to control the number of tourists, limit buildings, hotel facilities, etc. and reduce pollution is crucial. Effective enforcement mechanisms are vital to ensure compliance and protect fragile ecosystems. These policies, which will naturally take into account the ecological limits of each beach and the wider area, should be decided and implemented by the communities themselves that manage them. As Bollier (2016) argues, the Commons arise when a community makes the decision to manage a resource collectively and regulates its equitable access, use and sustainability.

C) Education and Awareness

Raising awareness among tourists, as well as permanent residents, about the impacts of overtourism is also vital. Educational initiatives can promote responsible tourism practices and foster a culture of respect. This can include, for example, informing visitors about the ecological and cultural significance of the beaches they visit.

Sustainable Tourism Models

Encouraging tourism models that prioritize sustainability over profit is essential. Soft ecotourism, which is designed to benefit the community, can offer an alternative that delivers economic benefits while maintaining environmental and cultural integrity. These tourism models rely on lower visitor numbers and more meaningful engagement with local communities and ecosystems.

For example, in Tuscany, Italy, agritourism practices are implemented, combining agricultural activities with tourism and providing visitors with the experience of rural life. Visitors can stay on farms where they work and participate in grape harvesting, learn about winemaking, and enjoy local foods, promoting sustainable agricultural practices and supporting the local economy.

Another example is that of Kerala in India where responsible tourism initiatives are being implemented with programs that include village tours, cultural performances and promotion of local handicrafts. The Kerala Responsible Tourism Mission Society is an initiative that works under the Ministry of Tourism to disseminate and implement the ideologies and initiatives of responsible tourism throughout the State.

Of course, to be initiatives of the Commons, these initiatives must be undertaken by the community of “commoners” and not by external components such as the state or the capitalist elite. On this basis, a protectionist movement from below is slowly beginning to appear, a “double movement” in Polanyi terms on the part of society, where we observe citizens resisting mass tourism and starting protests demanding their beaches back.

For example, in neighboring Spain, which is also suffering from overtourism, protests have begun in various areas. In Mallorca, a movement has recently been created to occupy the beaches by residents, who, under the slogan “Menys Turisme, Més Vida” (Less Tourism, More Life), are protesting overtourism. The same is true in the Canary Islands, where 50,000 residents took to the streets with the slogan “Canarias se agota,” meaning the Canaries are running out. In Granada, locals are mobilizing to express their problems with the influx of tourists, which, they claim, has made their neighborhood below the Alhambra palace uninhabitable.

Conclusion

Reclaiming our beaches and managing them as Commons is not an arbitrary or academic exercise, but an urgent need to ensure their survival in the face of neoliberal overtourism. By adopting an approach based on the Commons and explicit collective self-determination, we can protect beaches and the cultural identity of each place, as well as promote social equality and a more sustainable and democratic relationship between people and nature.

Communities must step up and take responsibility for the management of the natural resources that belong to them. This means that through collective processes and democratic decisions, they can – and must – determine how they will be used and protected. In this way, beaches are not treated as products to be exploited, but as common goods that belong to the community and require its care.

It is time to reconsider our relationship with nature and commit to preserving it for future generations. But this cannot be achieved without mobilization on the part of society. Managing beaches as Commons and adopting explicit collective self-institution are central to this case. Only in this way can we hope to preserve natural beauty and biodiversity, while moving towards more cohesive, just and democratic societies.

Bibliographic references

Bollier, D. (2016). Commons, a brief introduction.

Bookchin, M. (2016). The Ecology of Freedom: The Emergence and Dissolution of Hierarchy.

Hall, C. M. (2001). Trends in ocean and coastal tourism: the end of the last frontier?. Ocean & coastal management, 44(9-10), 601-618.

Hardin, G. (1968). The tragedy of the commons: the population problem has no technical solution; it requires a fundamental extension in morality. Science, 162(3859), 1243-1248.

Harvey, D. (2006). The New Imperialism.

Ostrom, E. (2002). Governing the Commons.

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This article explores the concept of direct democracy, focusing on the perspective of Cornelius Castoriadis. Direct democracy as a form of government emphasizes the active participation of citizens in decision-making processes, thereby enhancing agency and promoting collectivity. Castoriadis’ ideas on autonomy, self-determination, and the social imaginary form the theoretical basis of this analysis. The article discusses the significance of direct democracy in contemporary society, examining its potential benefits and challenges. Through an analysis of Castoriadis’ work and the contributions of other authors, this article aims to shed light on the transformative potential of direct democracy in imagining what a truly democratic and just society could be.

Castoriadis’s Concept of Autonomy

Central to understanding the possibilities of direct democracy is the concept of autonomy as introduced and explained by Cornelius Castoriadis. Castoriadis argues that true autonomy arises when individuals actively participate in shaping the institutions that govern their lives. Autonomy, according to Castoriadis, refers to the capacity and active commitment of individuals and collectivities to self-determination and self-government. It is the situation in which individuals and society collectively create and shape their own institutions and rules, rather than being governed by external principles or predetermined structures. For Castoriadis, genuine autonomy requires a continuous process of self-institutionalization, where individuals actively participate in the creation, revision, and transformation of social arrangements and law. It goes beyond simple freedom from external constraints and includes a proactive participation in the collective determination of the rules and structures that govern social, political, and economic life.

A key element of Castoriadis’s concept of autonomy is the idea that it is a collective endeavor. Autonomy is not just an individual pursuit, but involves the active engagement and participation of a community or society as a whole. He emphasizes the importance of collective decision-making and the creation of shared norms through inclusive and democratic processes. Castoriadis argues that autonomy is a fundamental human need and a necessary condition for individual and collective flourishing. He argues that the exercise of autonomy provides individuals with a sense of self-determination, personal fulfillment, and a meaningful connection to society. Autonomy allows individuals to actively shape their lives and contribute to the co-creation of the social world they inhabit.

Direct democracy plays a crucial role in understanding autonomy according to the philosopher, as it enables citizens to participate directly in decision-making processes, ensuring that power is not concentrated in the hands of a few – as is the case in today’s liberal oligarchies that call themselves democracies – but is distributed to all members of society. Through mechanisms such as referendums, assemblies and citizens’ initiatives, individuals have the opportunity to participate directly in shaping the institutions and policies that affect their lives. This active participation cultivates a sense of responsibility and empowerment among citizens, contributing to the realization of autonomy.

Castoriadis thus emphasizes the transformative potential of the regime of direct democracy as a means of realizing autonomy and promoting a more participatory and democratic society. By actively participating in the creation and revision of social norms, subjects can contribute to the creation of their own social reality and shape their collective social and political becoming.

Self-determination in Direct Democracy

Self-determination is a fundamental aspect of direct democracy according to Castoriadis. It refers to the active and continuous process through which individuals and collectivities collectively shape and modify the institutions, that is, the laws and informal rules that govern society. In the context of direct democracy, self-determination includes the active participation of citizens in the creation and revision of political, social, and economic arrangements. Self-determination, as previously stated, is achieved through various mechanisms that allow citizens to participate directly in decision-making processes. These mechanisms may include referendums, citizens’ assemblies, etc. Through these avenues, citizens have the opportunity to directly express their preferences, voice their concerns, and contribute to the shaping of policies and laws.

Self-determination is not a one-time event, but rather an ongoing and dynamic process. It requires ongoing commitment and participation by citizens. Through direct democratic practices, individuals can actively shape and modify existing institutions, as well as propose new ones. This process allows for the adaptation and evolution of social arrangements to meet the changing needs and expectations of the community. By engaging in self-determination, citizens are empowered and develop a sense of responsibility regarding decision-making processes. They become active subjects in shaping their lives and cease to be passive recipients of decisions made by external, heteronomous authorities.

Furthermore, self-determination promotes inclusion and diversity. It empowers marginalized voices and ensures that decisions reflect the pluralism of the population. By actively involving citizens in decision-making, self-institution can help address power inequalities and enhance social justice. It provides the conditions for the realization of individual and collective autonomy by enabling citizens to actively participate in shaping the institutions that govern their lives. Through self-institution, individuals exercise their autonomy by actively contributing to the creation and revision of social norms and structures.

The Role of the Social Imaginary

The concept of the social imaginary, as introduced by Castoriadis, is central to understanding the possibilities of direct democracy and its implications for society. The social imaginary refers to the shared meanings, symbols, and representations that shape collective identities, values, and institutions within a society. In the context of direct democracy, the social imaginary influences the ways in which citizens perceive and engage with political and social processes. It includes the narratives, beliefs, and cultural contexts that inform individuals’ understanding of their roles and responsibilities as members of a democratic society. The social imaginary provides a framework through which individuals make sense of the world, construct their identities, and relate to one another.

The social imaginary profoundly influences the functioning and success of direct democracy. It shapes citizens’ motivations, aspirations and willingness to participate in decision-making processes. A vibrant and inclusive social imaginary can inspire citizens to actively participate in political affairs and to participate in shaping their collective future. By promoting diverse perspectives and a sense of common purpose, the social imaginary can contribute to the creation of a participatory democratic culture. It encourages citizens to transcend their individual interests and work for the collective well-being. It provides a common language and a symbolic framework that allows citizens to communicate and collaborate effectively in democratic processes.

Furthermore, the social imaginary can serve as a catalyst for social change and the redesign of political structures. It can challenge existing power dynamics, challenge traditional hierarchies, and inspire alternative visions of governance. By shaping collective aspirations and values, the social imaginary can lead to transformative movements that seek to redefine and reimagine democratic institutions and practices.

However, the social imaginary is not a fixed entity. It is subject to challenge, revision, and change over time. Different social groups and individuals may develop different social imaginaries, which reflect different experiences, ideologies, and worldviews. This multiplicity of social imaginaries can lead to tensions and conflicts within a society, but it can also provide opportunities for dialogue, debate, and the enrichment of democratic processes. In the context of direct democracy, cultivating an inclusive and participatory social imaginary becomes crucial. It involves cultivating a culture of dialogue, respect, and active participation among citizens. This can be achieved through civic education, public consultation forums, and the promotion of alternative perspectives and marginalized voices.

Direct Democracy and Modern Society

Direct democracy has significant relevance in modern society as a response to the challenges and shortcomings of traditional representative democratic systems. In an era marked by political disillusionment, distrust in institutions, and calls for increased citizen participation, direct democracy offers a promising alternative that can revitalize democratic governance. Here are some key aspects that highlight the importance of direct democracy in modern society:

1. Enhanced citizen participation: Direct democracy places decision-making power directly in the hands of citizens, offering them a more active and meaningful role in the democratic process. It allows individuals to directly express their preferences, voice their concerns, and contribute to policymaking. By enabling broad citizen participation, direct democracy helps bridge the gap between citizens and government, fostering a sense of ownership in shaping public affairs.

2. Inclusion of marginalized voices: Traditional representative democracies often struggle to represent the interests and perspectives of marginalized groups, but in most cases either fail to do so or do not seek to do so. Direct democracy provides a framework in which these voices are heard and given equal consideration in decision-making processes. It allows for inclusive, fair participation by all citizens, addressing social inequalities and ensuring that the concerns of all segments of society are taken into account.

3. Debate and public discourse: Direct democracy encourages open and constructive public discourse on critical issues. It creates opportunities for informed debate, reflection and exchange of ideas among citizens. This deliberative aspect of direct democracy promotes a deeper understanding of complex problems and helps build consensus through reasoned dialogue, resulting in more just and robust policy outcomes.

4. Transparency and Accountability: Direct democracy promotes transparency and accountability in decision-making. Since citizens are directly involved in the process, there is greater visibility and scrutiny of the choices made and the reasons behind them. This transparency helps build trust, as decisions are made in a more visible and accessible way.

5. Political Engagement: Direct democracy encourages political engagement among citizens. It requires an informed and active citizenry who is aware of public issues, debates and the consequences of their decisions. By actively participating in decision-making processes, citizens gain a deeper understanding of democratic principles, develop critical thinking skills, and become more involved in the affairs that concern them.

Despite its benefits, direct democracy also faces challenges that must be addressed for its effective implementation. These challenges include information overload, the risk of tyranny of the majority, and the need to develop mechanisms for constructive debate on a large scale. However, with appropriate safeguards and mechanisms, direct democracy can flourish as a strong polity that promotes participatory democratic governance in modern society.

In conclusion, direct democracy, as understood by Castoriadis, has significant potential for revitalizing democratic governance. Through its emphasis on autonomy, self-determination, and the social imaginary, direct democracy promotes active citizen participation, empowering individuals to shape their collective destiny. While it offers many benefits, it also faces challenges that must be seriously considered for its successful implementation. As societies strive for democratic renewal, direct democracy is a valuable tool for revitalizing democratic processes and ensuring the active participation of citizens in shaping their common future.

Bibliography

Castoriadis, K. (1978). The Imaginary Institution of Society.

Castoriadis, K. (1996). The Rise of Insignificance.

Castoriadis, K. (2004). Window on Chaos.

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Cornelius Castoriadis (1922 – 1997) and Karl Polanyi (1886 – 1964) are two prominent, contemporary thinkers who both offered critical perspectives on modern society and the role of institutions in shaping social and economic relations. While they come from different intellectual schools and traditions and while they focus on different aspects of social/political theory, one can detect remarkable similarities and connections between their ideas, especially regarding the role of culture and institutions in shaping human behavior and social/economic organization. This short essay does not aim at an extensive and in-depth analysis of the work of the two thinkers, as this would require a much longer text, on the contrary it aims to compare and contrast basic concepts of Castoriadis’ “Imaginary institution of society” and Polanyi’s “Embeddedness of the economy” and to explore their possible contribution to the contemporary debate on social and political theory.

Cornelius Castoriadis and the Imaginary Institution of Society

Castoriadis, a Greek philosopher, psychoanalyst and political thinker, developed his idea of ​​the Imaginary Institution of Society, wanting to describe the way in which social reality is structured and maintained. His magnum opus, The Imaginary Institution of Society (1975), is a groundbreaking work in which the author introduces the idea and explores the role of the social imaginary – a central concept in his thought – in shaping human societies. According to Castoriadis, the social imaginary is not simply imagination, an illusion of the world, or a reflection of existing material and/or historical conditions; on the contrary, it is an active and creative force that shapes and constructs social reality. It is a universe of collective thought and action that is constantly being challenged and evolving, and which shapes the beliefs, values, institutions and symbols that structure human societies (Castoriadis, 1978).

Castoriadis emphasizes the importance of institutions and culture for the development of creative activity in society and argues that the former must be structured in such a way as to allow for individual and collective creativity, and that cultural norms and practices must be open processes to change and innovation (Castoriadis, op. cit.). The Imaginary Institution of Society is not fixed or predetermined, but rather (re)-created continuously through the collective activity and creativity of individuals. According to Castoriadis, this creativity arises from what he calls the “radical imaginary”, which is inherent in subjects and consists of human imagination and creativity that is not limited by the existing social structure. The “radical imaginary” is essentially the ability to imagine and create new ontological species, new meanings and institutions. Castoriadis thus emphasizes the importance of human agency and creativity in the construction of social reality, while underlining the continuous process of social and cultural transformation. Society as a creation of the anonymous collective imaginary, is imaginatively self-institutionalized.

At the heart of Castoriadis’ analysis is the idea of ​​individual and collective autonomy. Autonomy at the level of the individual is the institution of a new relationship between oneself and one’s unconscious and has enormous institutional prerequisites (Castoriadis, 1996). The author argues that the autonomy of the individual is vital for the flourishing of creative activity in society, as individuals must be free to participate in creative activities and to question existing meanings and symbols, in order for society to remain open to new possibilities (Castoriadis, 1978). Collective autonomy means that society consciously gives itself its own laws, excluding any idea of ​​heteronomy, that is, an extra-social source of laws and institutions, whether this source is considered natural or transcendental (e.g. oligarchic regimes, religions, free market, etc.). Autonomy translates into the regime of direct democracy, which according to Castoriadis is the explicit reflexive self-institution of society.

The Imaginary Institution of Society is a complex and multifaceted work that continues to influence contemporary debates about the relationship between culture, institutions, individuals, and society. Castoriadis’ ideas continue to contribute to discussions about the relationship between agency and social change, and his work has had a significant impact on a wide range of disciplines, including philosophy, sociology, and cultural studies.

Karl Polanyi and the Great Transformation

Polanyi, an Austro-Hungarian economist and social theorist, developed the concept of the “embedded economy” as a critique of the idea of ​​a self-regulating market that, according to liberal theorists, operates independently of social and cultural norms and values. Polanyi argues that the economy is not a separate sphere of activity, but rather is embedded in social relations and institutions. Economic transactions, according to the author, are not based solely on the market, but are influenced by social norms and values, such as reciprocity, trust and solidarity (Polanyi, 1944). He thus emphasizes the importance of social and cultural institutions in shaping economic behavior and the need to balance the rapid development of the market with social protection and collective well-being.

In his seminal and classic work, The Great Transformation, Polanyi explores the origins and consequences of the Industrial Revolution and the rise of capitalism in the 19th and early 20th centuries. He argues that the emergence of the market economy was not a natural or inevitable development, but rather a deliberate invention of liberal economists (Malthus, Ricardo, etc.) that violently transformed human society and created new forms of social and economic inequality (Cook, 1968). He traces the origins of the market economy to the 18th century, when the British government began to privatize previously common resources such as forests or plots of arable land. This process, which he calls “enclosure,” resulted in millions of peasants and smallholders being displaced from their lands to seek work in urban factories or to migrate to colonies. Polanyi argues that this process created a new type of economic system based on the commodification of labor, land, and capital (the fictitious commodities according to him) and the creation of markets for goods and services.

However, the author argues that this market-based system of organizing society is inherently unstable and unsustainable, as it creates social and economic inequalities that undermine the foundations of human society. He argues that the market economy is based on a misconception of human nature, which sees individuals as isolated and selfish subjects who pursue their own narrow interests without regard for others (Polanyi, 2014). In reality, Polanyi argues, humans are social beings who depend on each other for their survival and well-being and who have a deep-rooted need for social solidarity and cooperation. He ultimately concludes that the only way to create a sustainable and just society is to recognize the limitations of the market economy and develop new forms of social and economic organization based on social and ecological principles (Polanyi, op. cit.). He argues that this requires a fundamental transformation of our values ​​and institutions and a new vision of human society, which recognizes the interdependence of all and the need for collective action to address global challenges such as climate change and generalized inequality (Polanyi, 2017).

The Failure of Liberalism and the Importance of Institutions

In the analyses of the two thinkers, one can discern two obvious connections:

First, both criticize the reductive view of human nature, which is found in many modern social and economic theories that in turn led either to liberalism or to actual socialism. Theories that perceive modern man as homo economicus (economic man). Arbitrarily, these theories adopt an approach that defends an anthropological type who has a clear knowledge of his interests and is even able to realize them by freely choosing the way to maximize his individual benefit, based on purely rational criteria. Both Castoriadis and Polanyi argue that people are not simply rational individuals motivated by their own self-interest, but rather social and cultural beings. Castoriadis argues that culture is a fundamental aspect of human life and that individuals’ values ​​and beliefs are shaped by their historical and cultural context (Castoriadis, 1978). He also criticizes and questions the idea of ​​free trade, as he sees the hypocrisy behind the definition, since a real market, according to Castoriadis (2004), requires the hegemony of consumers and the abolition of monopolistic and oligopolistic powers, which is obviously not the case today. Similarly, Polanyi, arguing that economic systems are always embedded in social and cultural contexts, distinguishes that social and cultural factors play a crucial role in the formation of economic institutions and practices (Polanyi, 1944). Both Castoriadis and Polanyi therefore argue that understanding culture and history is a necessary condition for understanding social and economic systems.

Secondly, both emphasize the importance of institutions in shaping social and economic relations. Castoriadis sees the imaginary as a source of social rules and practices that regulate individual behavior and collective interaction. Institutions according to Castoriadis are created by society itself when it is autonomous, as only in heteronomous societies are institutions given by someone else. Consequently, a society based on the iron laws of the market and its invisible regulatory hand constitutes a heteronomous society according to Castoriadis, which according to Polanyi (1944) is doomed to fail. Polanyi sees the embeddedness of the economy in social relations as the basis for economic behavior that is not solely market-based, but is subject to social norms and values ​​(Dale, 2016). Furthermore, both Castoriadis and Polanyi argue that social institutions are dynamic and therefore constantly changing.

In conclusion, we argue that the implications of these similarities and connections in the work of the two thinkers are quite significant for contemporary discussions on social theory and economic policy. Both Castoriadis and Polanyi challenge the dominant paradigm of neoliberalism, which advocates the self-regulation of markets and the privatization of public and common goods. Both also argue for a more holistic and nuanced understanding of human behavior and social organization. The work of both provides valuable insights into the complex and dynamic nature of social and economic systems and challenges us to think more deeply about the role of institutions and culture in shaping our world.

Bibliographic references

Cook, S. (1968). Primitive, Archaic, and Modern Economies: Essays of Karl Polanyi.

Dale, G. (2016). Reconstructing Karl Polanyi.

Castoriadis, K. (1978). The Imaginary Institution of Society.

Castoriadis, K. (1996). The Rise of Insignificance.

Castoriadis, K. (2004). Window on Chaos.

Polanyi, K. (1944). The Great Transformation.

Polanyi, K. (2014). Our Outdated Market Mindset.

Polanyi, K. (2017). The invention of trade.

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