In traditional philosophical thought, the subject occupied a stable position, linking autonomy, rationality and moral action. The “ego” perceived itself as a central entity that remained constant in time and space, while the world around it, nature, society, could change. This stability was fundamental for the constitution of identity and subjectivity. For example, Descartes, with the famous “cogito ergo sum” (I think, therefore I am), defines the subject as an autonomous, enduring and self-existent substance (res cogitans). Descartes’ “ego” is the core of the subject, which, through thought, remains stable and unchanging. Later, Kant believed that the subject can transcend external conditions through “pure reason,” which allows him to determine his moral actions based on the categorical imperative, regardless of empirical or material influences.

However, with the advent of modernity and the subsequent deconstruction of “grand narratives” (Lyotard, 1994), the subject found itself radically challenged. This crisis of subjectivity is not limited to the existential crisis of the subject; on the contrary, it goes deeper and constitutes a crisis with a political dimension, since it affects the ability of individuals to act as autonomous beings in the collective institution of society (Castoriadis, 1978). Modern man does not only experience alienation from himself, but also alienation from the social and political processes that determine his life. The “Ego” is lost in the labyrinth.

The heteronomy of the market and the role of technology in shaping subjectivity

The market is one of the main institutions that lead the modern subject to a state of heteronomy. According to Castoriadis (1978), the capitalist imaginary meaning of “endless growth” shapes the value system of modern society, defining human existence through consumption. The individual is no longer autonomous, but a hetero-determined subject who depends on the laws of the market.

However, sterile consumption is not limited to material goods, but extends to experiences, relationships and the very way of life. Guy Debord (1994) describes this situation as a “society of the spectacle”, where people live through images and symbolic representations, distant from real life. The subject becomes a spectator in the theater of his life, while his desires and values ​​are shaped by the buzzwords of advertising and the entertainment industry. This in turn leads to a kind of consumer alienation, where the desires and needs of the individual are not his own, but products of external imposition. The subject does not recognize his own alienation and lives in a vicious circle of unfulfilled desires.

At the same time, the role of technology is also central to understanding the crisis of subjectivity. Castoriadis (1978) refers to the dominance of “technocratic logic”, which reduces all problems of society to technical issues, thus removing the political dimension of decisions. The citizen ceases to actively participate in the institution of society and is replaced by so-called “experts”.

New information technologies (such as algorithmic platforms, artificial intelligence, etc.) have the potential to influence subjectivity in subtle ways. As Shoshanna Zuboff (2023) aptly writes, the “capitalist surveillance system” constantly records and controls users’ preferences through data. Then, specialized algorithms, based on this data, shape the subject’s choices and direct them along predetermined paths. This “algorithmic control” is linked to the alienation of the subject, since it limits their ability to self-determine and self-reflect.

The Existential Void as the Collapse of Grand Narratives

The collapse of “grand narratives” in postmodernity, as Lyotard (1994) argued, led to the inability of the subject to find meaning in his life. The term “grand narratives” refers to the loss of trust in the systems of meaning that offered guidelines for society and the individual. Examples of such narratives are the ideologies of the Enlightenment, Marxism, but also traditional religious worldviews, which presented comprehensive explanations for the life, history and future of humanity.

These grand narratives were for centuries the foundation of subjective stability. Through them, the individual could find a purpose in his life, define his identity and understand his place in the world. For example, the Enlightenment introduced a belief in progress, rational thought, and the autonomy of the individual. Marxism, on the other hand, promised the liberation of man from exploitation and the construction of a just classless society. Finally, religions have historically provided metaphysical explanations for existence, offering solace through belief in a higher power and the promise of an afterlife and bliss.

However, Lyotard (1994) argues that in postmodernity, these narratives have lost their credibility. Scientific challenge, philosophical deconstruction (such as that of Derrida), and the realization of practical failure (such as communist or neoliberal regimes) have shown that these narratives were not as neutral and true as they were presented. The supposed “neutrality” of science has been revealed as a tool of power, as seen in colonialism, technocracy and the environmental destruction caused by the logic of development.

However, if the collective stories that once gave meaning to human life have been dissolved, then the individual is called upon to create his own meaning on his own. In postmodernity, the individual assumes the role of the autonomous constructor of his identity, but without having any stable foundation. In this context, the subject is confronted with uncertainty, gets lost in the inflation of information and finally, as Zygmunt Bauman (2013) says, turns into a “fluid subject” demonstrating that his identity is constantly changing depending on the conditions of each era. The individual now understands that he must seek an internal center of gravity, an “inner guide”, in order to define himself. However, this is not an easy task. The autonomy of the modern individual is both a burden and a challenge, as the subject must constantly choose the meaning of his existence. Where in the past, his identity was associated with clear roles such as “worker”, “Christian”, “citizen” etc., in postmodernity, the subject is called to constantly create himself.

Castoriadis offers an alternative, optimistic perspective on the crisis of subjectivity. While he clearly recognizes the deconstruction of grand narratives, he does not end up with Lyotard’s nihilism. On the contrary, he argues that the subject can achieve a radical autonomy, creating his own values ​​through collective self-institution (Castoriadis, 1978). The thinker argues that the subject must cease to rely on prefabricated narratives and become a co-creator of society and his own identity. This possibility, however, requires a radical change in the anthropological type, namely the emergence of an autonomous human being; not as an ideal or abstract subject, but as an existing and historically contingent project, which stems from the very possibility of social self-institution.

The Collective Overman?

Castoriadis’s concept of the “autonomous man” can be seen as a collective reinterpretation of Friedrich Nietzsche’s Overman. A philosophical shift that highlights the role of collective creation in the constitution of the autonomy of the subject. The Overman, as introduced by Nietzsche, is the personification of the creative power that emerges through the collapse of the metaphysical order and the recognition of the “death of God” (Nietzsche, 1883/1995). Rejecting the resentment and servile morality of the Christian tradition, Nietzsche proposes a type of man who creates new values ​​and embodies the will to power, living beyond the opposition of good and evil (Reginster, 2006). In the concept of the Overman, however, autonomy is completely individual, drawing its power from individual will and the overcoming of nihilism, without requiring collective recognition or participation.

In contrast, Castoriadis, through his work, proposes a radically different project for autonomy. For him, autonomy is not an individual state but a collective process. The autonomous person is given meaning and exists within the framework of a society that recognizes its ability to create and transform its institutions and meanings, through the social imaginary (Castoriadis, 1978). Autonomy, here, is not an individual overcoming of social boundaries, but a collective capacity to recognize institutions as human creations and to subject them to reflective criticism.

What makes the autonomous subject a collective reinterpretation of the Overman is the rejection of loneliness and distancing from society, characteristics that clearly permeate the Nietzschean vision. The Overman embodies an absolute autonomy that does not need collectivity to create new values. In contrast, Castoriadis places autonomy in the realm of the social imagination, a process where meaning and values ​​are produced through collective dialogue and participatory action (Arnason, 2001).

At the same time, the philosophical dimension of transcendence differentiates the two approaches. In Nietzsche, the transcendence of traditional values ​​and institutions is the result of the individual will to power, which is driven by the personal need to create meaning. In Castoriadis, transcendence emerges through reflective critique and collective action, making autonomy a continuous process of questioning and re-creating social institutions. Here, democracy becomes the space within which autonomy can be realized, something that is absent from Nietzschean thought.

This opposition, ultimately, reflects the difference between the individual and collective dimensions of autonomy. While the Overman proposes the solitary transcendence of man who lives beyond social conventions, the autonomous man is based on the recognition of society as a field of creation and questioning. Nietzsche rejects collective action as limiting for individual creativity, while Castoriadis includes it as a condition for the very existence of autonomy. Castoriadis’s thought highlights the importance of democratic process, dialogue, and social imagination in the construction of human freedom, proposing a way of understanding autonomy that recognizes the reflective capacity of society as fundamental to human creativity. Ultimately, Castoriadis’ ideas lend an optimistic perspective to an otherwise bleak landscape.

In conclusion

While the postmodern era highlights the deconstruction of fixed identities and narratives, this fluidity can be an opportunity for the creation of a new anthropological type. The transition from heteronomy to autonomy, both at the individual and collective levels, requires a paradigm shift in the perception of the self and society. The possibility for radical autonomy and self-establishment is real, but it requires a profound transformation of human consciousness and practice. The new anthropological type that must emerge, the autonomous human, embodies this challenge, linking individual self-knowledge with collective action.

Overcoming the crisis of subjectivity, therefore, does not lie in returning to traditional narratives or in absolute Nietzschean individuality, but in developing a new quality that combines critical thinking, collectivity, and creativity. The contemporary crisis of meaning, although painful, can play a catalytic role for a more meaningful and authentic existence on both a personal and a social level.

Bibliography

Arnason, J. P. (2001). The Imaginary Constitution of Modernity: Cornelius Castoriadis. European Journal of Social Theory, 4(4), 351–364.

Bauman, Z. (2013). Liquid modernity.

Castoriadis, C. (1978). The Imaginary Institution of Society.

Debord, G. (2016). Η Κοινωνία του Θεάματος.

Lyotard, J. F. (1994). The postmodern condition. The postmodern turn: new perspectives on modern theory, 27-38.

Nietzsche, F. (1883/2008). Τάδε έφη Ζαρατούστρα.

Reginster, B. (2006). The Affirmation of Life: Nietzsche on Overcoming Nihilism.

Zuboff, S. (2023). The age of surveillance capitalism. In Social theory re-wired (pp. 203-213).

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The imaginary institution of nature and the ecological dimension of autonomy

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Post The postmodern crisis of subjectivity. The “Ego” lost in the labyrinth. first showed at Elias Sekeris | Webspace.

The ecological crisis and the need for a new way of viewing the relationship between humans and the natural world are issues that preoccupied both Cornelius Castoriadis and Murray Bookchin, two of the most important thinkers of the 20th century. Despite the differences in their approach, both thinkers focus on the necessity of a radical reorganization of the way in which societies perceive nature. Bookchin, with his theory of social ecology, argues that the ecological crisis is a product of the hierarchical and oppressive social structures that characterize the modern world. Castoriadis, on the other hand, through his theory of autonomy and imaginary institution, proposes a more profound change in the fundamental values ​​and meanings that compose social life, emphasizing that the ecological crisis is a symptom of the broader cultural crisis that permeates the modern world. The combined analysis of the two theories can offer a comprehensive approach to nature and ecology, laying the foundation for the creation of a sustainable and autonomous society.

The imaginary institution of nature

The imaginary institution of nature is a crucial point for understanding not only the ecological crisis but also the very social and political organization of contemporary Western societies.

But what do we mean by the term “imaginary institution of nature”?

Cornelius Castoriadis, the proponent of the concept of the imaginary, through his critique of the Western metaphysical tradition, brings to the fore the historicity and social construction of nature as an object, institutionalized through the imaginary of societies. In modernity, nature ceases to be a living organism – as, for example, the ancient Greeks understood it through the term “cosmos” or the Eastern philosophies as a whole – and is transformed into a mechanistic space, a stripped “resource” for exploitation. Man, motivated by the Cartesian imaginary of the subject-object distinction, becomes “master and possessor” of nature (Descartes, 1637/2005), alienating himself from it and from his vital connection with it.

This alienation is not a natural evolution of human thought, but is the result of specific historical and cultural processes. The imaginary institutionalization of nature in the Western world is linked to the rise of the capitalist economy and the instrumentalization of human action through technology. This institutionalization is based on the “unlimited expansion of rationality”, where everything natural or human becomes an object of rationalization and domination (Castoriadis, 1999 a).

The recognition of nature as an institutionalized category deconstructs the essentialist approach that treats it as an external reality. In this context, Castoriadis proposes an alternative imaginary institution, where nature is reintegrated into the collective and individual imaginary, as a space of coexistence and creativity and not as an object of exploitation. Here, autonomy comes to the fore: society is called upon to reflect on and recreate its relationship with nature, founding new institutions based on respect and reciprocity.

Ecological Crisis and Technocracy: Castoriadis’ Critique

The ecological crisis, then, is not a simple set of environmental problems, as many ecological movements and activists perceive it. It is a symptom of a profound deregulation of the imaginary and the institutionalized logic of Western society. The core of the crisis lies in the dynamics of technocracy, whose logic is inherently alienating.

Technocratic thought sees nature as nothing more than a problem to be solved through technical means. Furthermore, the philosophy of sovereignty that permeates modern society leads to the annihilation of the natural world in the name of “progress.” This logic emerges through the combination of scientific thought and the capitalist pursuit of profit, producing a double alienation: both of man from nature and from human subjectivity itself (Castoriadis, 1999 b).

At the same time, technocracy cannot respond to ecological challenges because, of course, it remains trapped in precisely this logic that gave rise to the crisis. The ecological crisis requires a radical questioning of the imaginary of sovereignty and uncontrolled development. In this light, Castoriadis (1978) emphasizes the need for a different way of thinking, where political action and collective reflection will pave the way for a substantial direct democratic reorganization of social life.

Castoriadis and Bookchin Discussion: Ecology and Democracy

The connection of ecology with democracy is a crucial point, both in the thought of Castoriadis and in that of Murray Bookchin. Although the two thinkers start from different philosophical traditions, they converge on the need for a radical revision of the way in which societies are organized and perceive their relationship with nature. However, their differences in the way they approach the concept of autonomy and the position of the ecological issue highlight interesting philosophical contrasts.

Bookchin, through his work and especially in social ecology, argues that the ecological crisis is inextricably linked to hierarchical structures and political inequality. He sees the domination of man over nature as an extension of the domination of man over man (Bookchin, 1982). For the American thinker, the solution lies not only in protecting the environment through technocratic measures, but in the radically transformative power of direct democracy. His social ecology rejects both the one-dimensional development of technology and the idea of ​​nature as independent of society.

Castoriadis, for his part, emphasizes the imaginary dimension of the human relationship with nature and the centrality of autonomy as a prerequisite for any ecological solution. Democracy, for Castoriadis, is not simply a decision-making process, but a total reconstruction of the way in which people make sense of the world and their role in it. The ecological crisis, therefore, is not only a question of social hierarchies, as Bookchin argues, but also the result of a fundamental alienation of man from nature, but also from himself.

Where Bookchin proposes institutional change through direct democracy, Castoriadis introduces the deeper need to subvert the imaginary that legitimizes the logic of sovereignty. For Bookchin, nature and society are dialectically connected, but for Castoriadis, this connection remains unattainable without the human capacity to reflect on its institutions and values. Collective reflection and critical autonomy are the key to challenging the instrumental and technocratic view of nature.

Democracy, according to Castoriadis, acquires an ecological dimension when the citizen becomes a co-creator of social and environmental contexts, rather than treating nature as an external category. This approach goes beyond Bookchin, as it emphasizes that no institutional change can be sustainable without the renewal of the human imaginary. The human-nature relationship, therefore, is both a political and an ontological challenge, requiring a new way of being and acting.

Revisiting Bookchin: Critique and Extension through Castoriadis’ Thought

Bookchin proposes the creation of an eco-communitarian society based on the principle of rational interdependence of humans and nature (Bookchin, 2023). While this view is particularly important for connecting the ecological issue to democracy, it limits the possibility of transformation to the level of institutional change. According to Castoriadis, institutions are products of imaginary institutionalization, and therefore any change at the level of institutions requires a radical revision of the way in which we make sense of our social and physical existence.

Bookchin treats nature as a system with inherent “ecological principles” that can guide social transformation. In contrast, Castoriadis sees nature as open and indeterminate, an abyss of meaning that does not impose any specific social structure. This means that values ​​and practices related to nature cannot depend solely on “natural laws” but require a continuous critical and creative process (Castoriadis, 1978).

Thus, where Bookchin proposes a new social organization, Castoriadis argues that the very imaginary institution of nature as a tool or object to be exploited must be deconstructed. According to Castoriadis, modernity is characterized by an instrumental conception of nature, which is the product of the imaginary domination of economic and technological rationality. Bookchin does not give sufficient emphasis to this fundamental dimension of the imaginary, which limits his theory to the level of practical rather than ontological changes.

The Castoriadian approach can extend Bookchin’s theory by incorporating the dimension of autonomy as a prerequisite for any substantial ecological change. Reflection on the very institutions and values ​​of society is the only path to liberation from the imaginary constructions that legitimize the destruction of nature. Thus, while Bookchin proposes an institutional return to the harmony of nature and society, Castoriadis goes deeper, proposing a total reconstruction of the imaginary that gives meaning to this relationship.

Towards an Alternative Imaginary Institution: Autonomy and the Human-Nature Relationship

We have seen that the contemporary imaginary institutionalization of capitalism (but also of Marxism) perceives nature as an unlimited resource that can be consumed in the context of perpetual development. This perception is not simply economic, but deeply ontological, as it reproduces a type of human who sees the world instrumentally, cut off from its natural basis (Latouche, 2009). Castoriadis argues that transcending this logic requires the creation of a new anthropological type, a subject who recognizes himself as part of a larger ecological and social whole.

In this context, autonomy includes the recognition of nature as a value in itself, independent of human needs. In an autonomous society, the human-nature relationship is not one of domination but of symbiosis and respect. Such a relationship, however, is only possible when societies abandon the logics of instrumental domination and turn towards a more substantial and meaningful understanding of the world.

In conclusion, the refoundation of the imaginary concerns not only nature but also man himself. Change cannot be limited to external reforms but must include a profound transformation of the anthropological type that has developed in modernity. This new type of human being must combine the capacity for autonomy with a sense of collective responsibility towards the world. A new alternative imaginary institution involves the cultivation of a new way of being, where autonomy and ecology are not treated as separate spheres but as deeply intertwined. In this context, man is not a conqueror of nature but a part of it, acting as a co-creator of a sustainable world. The crisis, therefore, is not simply a catastrophe but also an opportunity for the foundation of a new social and ontological order.

Bibliography

Castoriadis, C. (1978). The Imaginary Institution of Society. Athens: Kedros.

Castoriadis, C. (1999 a). The Crossroads of the Labyrinth. Athens: Ypsilon.

Castoriadis, C. (1999 b). A world in fragments. Athens: Ypsilon.

Descartes, R. (2005). Discourse on Method and the Meditations. Penguin UK.

Bookchin, M. (1982). The ecology of freedom.

Bookchin, M. (2023). Remaking Society: A New Ecological Politics. AK Press.

Latouche, S. (2009). Farewell to growth. Polity.

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